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The doctrine of cybertrespass represents one of the most recent 
attempts by courts to apply concepts and principles from the real 
world to the virtual world of the Internet. A creation of state 
common law, the doctrine essentially involved extending the tort 
of trespass to chattels to the electronic world. Consequently, un-
authorized electronic interferences are deemed trespassory 
intrusions and rendered actionable. The present paper aims to 
undertake a conceptual study of the evolution of the doctrine, 
examining the doctrinal modifications courts were required to 
make to mould the doctrine to meet the specificities of cyber-
space. It then uses cybertrespass to examine the implications of 
transposing property metaphors to the world of the Internet, 
characterized by the absence of resource rivalry and the reality 
of positive value enhancement through increased usage (i.e., a 
network effect, whereby participation in use by many is a condi-
tion for value in use by any). It is argued that the transposition 
of proprietary concepts to the Internet is done for purely instru-
mental reasons—reasons that derive neither from the nature of 
the resource nor its usage. The paper then evaluates whether 
such an instrumental use of proprietary concepts on the Internet 
has any effect on the meaning ordinarily attributed to the concept 
of property and the identification of property as an independent 
institution of moral significance. It concludes by showing that the 
relative neglect that doctrines such as cybertrespass have for 
identifying the boundaries of the res over which the property 
right is to operate, is capable of undermining the minimum core 
of any understanding of property as an independent institution. 
Introduction 
With the exponential growth of the Internet over the course of the 
last decade, courts and legislatures around the world have been forced to 
evolve legal principles to govern interactions in cyberspace. While a 
large number of these principles were original and developed de novo for 
the Internet, a significant number involved applying the extant body of 
legal rules to the virtual world. Property law by and large, fell into the 
latter of the two categories. As the process of transposing property con-
cepts to the Internet began, it soon came to be realized that this was 
effecting a fundamental reconfiguration of the ways in which the Internet 
was meant to be used and developed. The Internet, initially visualized as 
a commons-based network was coming to be controlled extensively 
through private monopolies, operating through property rights. Freedom 
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and openness, considered by many to be the hallmarks of the Internet, 
were coming to be replaced with extensive private control—characterized 
by the term ‘propertization’.1  
The doctrine of cybertrespass emerged in this context, with the 
courts’ application of the common law cause of action of trespass to 
chattels to the Internet. Reasoning that electronic interferences with 
server space constituted a tangible invasion, they thus found no problems 
with applying the doctrine to the world of cyberspace. In the process of 
adapting the doctrine to meet the requirements of cyberspace and fashion-
ing a new remedy however, courts soon began to ignore the conceptual 
nuances that it involved and had come to incorporate in recognition of the 
nature of the resources it was applied in relation to, i.e., movables. As a 
consequence, the body of law that has emerged in relation to cybertrespass 
is replete with doctrinal ambiguities and inconsistencies. 
Most of the literature that has thus far examined the doctrine of cy-
bertrespass has tended to focus invariably on the broader policy issues 
involved.2 Cybertrespass is thus viewed as characteristic of the properti-
zation of the Internet and consequently, scholars have tended to focus the 
debate on the implications of the doctrine and propertization in general 
for the Internet as a whole. At one end of the spectrum are the critics of 
this propertization, who argue that ‘over-propertizing’ the Internet and 
related informational goods will actually curb technological creativity 
and impede fundamental freedoms on the Internet.3 Specifically in the 
context of cybertrespass, this school of thought argues that the doctrine 
results in a form of ‘over-propertization’ that can actually impede the use 
of and innovation on the Internet, that it poses a threat to fundamental 
activities on the Internet or that it will impede the full realization of the 
Internet’s value as a technology of freedom.4 At the other end of the 
                                                                                                                                 
 1. See Lawrence Lessig, The Future of Ideas (2001). 
 2. But see Daniel J. Caffarelli, Crossing Virtual Lines; Trespass on the Internet, 5 B.U. 
J. Sci. & Tech. L. 6 (1999) (examining the application of four prominent justificatory theories 
of property to the Internet and concluding that the law ought to recognize personal property in 
web sites). 
 3. See James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Enclosure of the Public 
Domain, 66 L & Contemp. Probs. 33 (2003); Lawrence Lessig, The Architecture of Innova-
tion, 51 Duke L.J. 1783 (2002); Maureen A. O’Rourke, Property Rights and Competition on 
the Internet: In Search of an Appropriate Analogy, 16 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 561 (2001). 
 4. See Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the Digital Anticommons, 
91 Cal. L Rev. 439 (2003); Mark A. Lemley, Place and Cyberspace, 91 Cal. L Rev. 521 
(2003); Dan L. Burk, The Trouble with Trespass, 4 J. Small & Emerging Bus. L 27 (2000); 
Laura Quilter, The Continuing Expansion of Cyberspace Trespass to Chattels, 17 Berkeley 
Tech. L.J. 421 (2002); R. Clifton Merrell, Trespass to Chattels in the Age of the Internet, 80 
Wash. U. L.Q. 675 (2002); Steve Fischer, When Animals Attack: Spiders and Internet Tres-
pass, 2 Minn. Intell. Prop. Rev. 139 (2001). 
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spectrum are the economic libertarians, who argue that increased proper-
tization is critical for the Internet so as to facilitate transactions on the 
Internet, which would in turn result in the optimal allocation of re-
sources.5 In the context of cybertrespass, they argue that the doctrine 
does not go nearly far enough, in propertizing virtual space.6  
What characterizes most of this literature on both sides of the debate 
however is a relative neglect of the conceptual issues involved in the 
transplantation of proprietary concepts to the Internet. While the doctrine 
of trespass to chattels (on which cybertrespass is modeled) is undoubt-
edly one of tort law, it nevertheless is premised on the existence of an 
underlying property right, which it seeks to vindicate, affirm and protect. 
It therefore becomes crucial to examine how the understanding of ‘prop-
erty’ gets transmogrified during this move from the real to the virtual 
world. For over a century, legal theorists and philosophers have at-
tempted to develop coherent theories to understand and justify the 
institution of property. Using the doctrine of cybertrespass, the present 
paper seeks to examine whether the application of property concepts to 
the Internet has any impact on the core assumptions and conceptual tools 
that underlie this understanding. It thus consciously attempts to analyze 
the doctrine of cybertrespass from a conceptual angle, focusing on the 
constitutive elements of the doctrine and its proprietary nature and dis-
cussing policy issues only in so far as they have a bearing on the 
conceptual apparatus involved.  
The paper attempts to show that just as the doctrine may have far-
reaching policy-related problems, so too does it have fundamental con-
ceptual flaws that derive from the imprecision of perfunctorily 
transplanting proprietary concepts from the real to the virtual world. It is 
argued that the application of the property metaphor to the Internet 
through the doctrine of cybertrespass is done for purely instrumental 
reasons—that unlike in the context of other intangibles have no relation 
to the resource sought to be protected. This represents a fundamental 
shift from the ordinary deployment of property metaphors in the context 
                                                                                                                                 
 5. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace Versus Property Law, 4 Texas Rev. L. & 
Politics 103 (1999–2000); Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 
[1996] U. Chi. Legal Forum 207; Frank H. Easterbrook, Intellectual Property is still Prop-
erty, 13 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol. 108 (1991); Richard A. Epstein, Intellectual Property: Old 
Boundaries and New Frontiers, 76 Ind. L.J. 804, 818–21 (2001). 
 6. Richard A. Epstein, Cybertrespass, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 73 (2003); Richard A. Ep-
stein, Intel v. Hamidi: The Role of Self-help in Cyberspace?, 1 J.L. Econ. & Pol. 147 (2005); 
Richard Warner, Virtual Borders: Trespass to Chattels on the Internet, 47 Vill. L. Rev. 117 
(2002); Daniel Kearney, Network Effects and the Emerging Doctrine of Cybertrespass, 23 
Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 313 (2005) (arguing that a clear rule of cybertrespass will maximize 
the efficiencies of online networks). 
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of intangibles and is premised on an attempt to regulate individual be-
havior on the Internet through the use of property-tort doctrine. 
Part I provides a detailed analysis of the doctrine of cybertrespass, 
tracing its evolution in cases of unwanted mass electronic communica-
tions (spam) and examining the gradual crystallization of its constituent 
requirements, with its resultant ambiguities. After examining the process 
through which common law courts ordinarily create new property inter-
ests in intangibles (Part I.A) and the basics of the tort of trespass to 
chattels (Part I.B), it proceeds to analyze the genesis of cybertrespass in 
three phases (Part I.C). While the phases are chronological in sequence, 
they each also represent a distinct conceptual approach that courts 
adopted at the time, in turn representative of the relative levels of confi-
dence with which they applied the doctrine to new situations. Part I then 
concludes by examining possible reasons why courts chose the trespass 
to chattels metaphor over the trespass to realty one, in the context of the 
Internet and posits two possible explanations (Part I.D). 
Part II attempts to focus on examining cybertrespass through the 
prism that is property theory—examining possible reasons for the use of 
the property concept on the Internet and identifying the conceptual prob-
lems associated with the same. It begins with an overview of what the 
concept of property means and attempts to identify a minimum core of 
commonality between some of the more prominent conceptions of prop-
erty (Part II.A) and then examines the problems associated with the 
metaphorical application of the property concept to intangibles and the 
changes in some of the core assumptions of property that this might nec-
essarily entail (Part II.B). Part II.C then argues that the metaphorical 
application of trespass to chattels to the Internet faces an additional 
problem; one associated with the precise identification of the resource 
from which the exclusion is to operate, that derives from the layered na-
ture of the Internet. 
The paper then concludes by arguing that cybertrespass aptly illus-
trates the problems associated with the instrumental use of common law 
theories, when such use ignores the doctrinal nuances that the common 
law has come to develop. 
I. Cybertrespass: New Cause of Action/Novel 
Proprietary Interest? 
A. Common Law Proprietary Entitlements in Information 
How have courts approached the issue of creating or recognizing 
novel proprietary interests in informational goods? The process through 
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which this is usually done by courts, exhibits a synthetic interaction be-
tween the very right sought to be protected and the remedy through 
which such protection is ultimately accorded. Does this render the con-
ceptual distinction between a property right and a proprietary remedy, 
redundant? 
In relation to judicially-created proprietary entitlements, a point that 
becomes readily apparent is the difference in approach between courts in 
the United States and those in other common law jurisdictions, most no-
tably the United Kingdom and Australia. Courts in the United States 
have been more ready to create novel interests than their overseas coun-
terparts.7 While the reasons for the same are beyond the scope of the 
present paper, it is crucial to bear this in mind, given that the doctrine of 
cybertrespass is ultimately the creation of the American judiciary. 
The courts’ readiness to break new doctrinal ground is shown par 
excellence in International News Services (INS) v. Associated Press,8 
where the United States Supreme Court recognized in the plaintiff a 
‘quasi-proprietary’ entitlement to restrict competitors from misappropri-
ating news reports that it had expended time and resources to collect. 
The defendant in this case, had copied news stories from the plaintiffs 
east coast edition, for its own west coast edition. The majority of the 
court, influenced by the seeming unfairness of letting one party free ride 
on the efforts of another, found itself unfettered in fashioning a proprie-
tary remedy under the head of ‘misappropriation’. Brandeis J, in his 
forcefully worded dissent, made explicit the problems associated with 
the judicial creation of novel proprietary interests, characterizing courts 
as ill-equipped and powerless for the task.9 While the majority of the 
Court went out of its way to make clear that the right it was creating 
would operate only in personam and not in rem,10 it appeared much less 
concerned with the need to establish the conceptual malleability of the 
common law—crucial to the methodological legitimacy of its endeavor.  
                                                                                                                                 
 7. For a general discussion, see Andrew Terry, Unfair Competition and the Misappro-
priation of a Competitor’s Trade Values, 51 Mod. L. Rev. 296 (1988); Gerald Dworkin, 
Unfair Competition: Is the Common Law Developing a New Tort?, [1979] Eur. Intell. Prop. 
Rev. 241; Sam Ricketson, Reaping Without Sowing: Unfair Competition and Intellectual 
Property Rights in Anglo-Australian Law, [1984] U. New South Wales L.J. 1.  
 8. 248 U.S. 215 (1918). 
 9. Id. at 267. 
 10. Id. at 236. The Court observed, “we hardly can fail to recognize that for this pur-
pose, and as between them, it must be regarded as quasi property, irrespective of the rights of 
either as against the public.” 
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The Court’s approach in INS has been commended by Epstein as be-
ing an apt illustration of legal incrementalism;11 the minimalist 
development of legal principles through individual cases and analogies.12 
While incrementalism may certainly be preferable to open-ended judicial 
policy-making, it nevertheless remains true that when it involves radical 
reformulations of entrenched doctrines (as it did in INS) to suit the re-
quirements of an individual case, it sets a methodological precedent; a 
precedent to the effect that there exists nothing within the realm of the 
common law that militates against such individual reformulations of the 
very conceptual apparatus. 
By contrast, the High Court of Australia refused to allow a similar 
reformulation in Victoria Park Racing & Recreation Co Ltd v. Taylor,13 
where the plaintiff sought to prevent the defendant from using valuable 
information that it had obtained, of activities in which the plaintiffs had 
invested considerable time and money. The plaintiff was the owner of a 
public facility where horse races took place on a regular basis. The de-
fendant owned the adjacent plot of land and erected a tower on his land 
so as to overlook the plaintiff’s property and from the tower allowed the 
broadcasting of information about the actual races as they occurred, 
thereby enabling individuals to bet on the races without actually being 
present at the facility. In expressly refusing to follow the majority opin-
ion in INS, the Court noted that since the interest in question did not fall 
into any of the well-defined categories recognized by the law, it would 
not qualify for any form of protection.14 
While courts in Australia and the UK have been reluctant to formu-
late an independent quasi-proprietary remedy of misappropriation, this 
does not imply that they are any less concerned than their American 
counterparts, in protecting the commercial interests of the plaintiffs in 
question. Their reluctance is thus restricted to the realm of creating novel 
proprietary interests. In so far as they can achieve the same results through 
existent doctrinal structures, their opposition to the result becomes far less 
                                                                                                                                 
 11. Richard A. Epstein, International News Service v. Associated Press: Custom and 
Law as Sources of Property Rights in News, 78 Va. L. Rev. 85 (1992). 
 12. For a general overview of incrementalism, also referred to as a variant of judicial 
minimalism, see Cass R. Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the 
Supreme Court (1999). Sunstein makes the argument that a minimalist approach is likely to 
reduce the deleterious consequences of judicial errors.  
 13. (1937) 58 C.L.R. 479 (HCA). 
 14. Id. at 509 (per Dixon J). The decision in this case has since been re-affirmed by the 
High Court in more recent cases, see Moorgate Tobacco Co Ltd v. Phillip Morris Ltd, (1984) 
156 C.L.R. 414 (HCA). 
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forceful.15 One area where they have managed to achieve the same re-
lates to the common law cause of passing off. 
The tortious doctrine of passing off has traditionally concerned itself 
with the core element of misrepresentation. In the most basic terms, the 
cause of action is said to arise when one person sells his own goods un-
der the pretence that they are those of another.16 The element of 
misrepresentation has however in recent times, been expansively inter-
preted to cover situations that would ordinarily have been thought of as 
falling under the category of misappropriation. This move from misrep-
resentation to misappropriation is however, very subtle and involves no 
major reformulations of existing concepts.17  
Every instance of informational misappropriation involves a misrep-
resentation, though not necessarily vice-versa. Passing off has thus 
evolved to now cover situations not only where the defendant passes off 
his goods as those of the plaintiff, but also where the defendant passes 
off the plaintiff’s goods as his own. The latter situation, while materially 
different, in that it involves the free-riding on the plaintiff’s goodwill 
(i.e., a misappropriation), is no less a misrepresentation (of source) and 
consequently, common law courts have found little difficulty in extend-
ing passing off to cover this subtle variant as well.18 
The distinction between creating a novel tortious remedy for the 
misappropriation of intangibles and subsuming the factual scenario un-
der the existent form of liability for passing off is more than one of mere 
nomenclature. It lies in the fact that the former approach effectively re-
sults in the creation of a new proprietary entitlement, while the latter 
merely protects an existent entitlement (i.e., reputation or goodwill) un-
der a modified liability rule. Calabresi and Melamed,19 in their highly 
                                                                                                                                 
 15. Id. In this context, Dixon J’s observations that the courts “have not in British juris-
dictions thrown the protection of an injunction around all the intangible elements of value, that 
is value in exchange, which may flow from the exercise by an individual of his powers or 
resources whether in the organisation of a business or undertaking or in the use of ingenuity, 
knowledge, skill or labour”, are of questionable applicability in the present context. 
 16. Perry v. Truefitt, (1842) 6 Beav. 66, 49 E.R. 749. See also Warnink v. Townend & 
Sons Ltd, [1979] A.C. 731 (HL). 
 17. For a detailed analysis of this paradigm shift, see Michael Spence, Passing Off and 
the Misappropriation of Valuable Intangibles, 112 L. Quart. Rev. 472 (1996). 
 18. Cases most directly representative of this trend include the common law geographi-
cal indication cases: Bollinger v. Costa Brava Wine Co Ltd, [1961] 1 W.L.R. 277 (Ch. D); 
Taittinger v. Allbev Ltd, [1994] 4 All E.R. 75 (CA) and those relating to character merchandis-
ing: Mirage Studios v. Counter-Feat Clothing Co Ltd, [1991] F.S.R. 145; Hogan v. Koala 
Dundee Pty Ltd, (1988) 20 F.C.R. 314. 
 19. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and In-
alienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089 (1972). 
BALGANESH TYPE.DOC 10/2/2006  2:08 PM 
Spring 2006] Common Law Property Metaphors on the Internet 273 
 
influential analysis,20 define a proprietary entitlement as one where the 
removal of the entitlement by a person from another requires the former 
to enter into a voluntary transaction with the latter to determine the value 
of the entitlement.21 The state’s role is thus ordinarily restricted to inter-
vening in order to restore the entitlement on the basis of the voluntarily 
pre-determined value. In the case of a liability rule however, a person is 
entitled to destroy the entitlement of another as long as he is willing to 
pay an objectively determined amount for it; the distinction being that 
the amount is determined objectively with the original owner’s subjec-
tive valuation having little bearing on the computation.22 
A rule safeguarding a claim by premising itself on the validity of a 
pre-existent distribution and thereby seeking to restore the same, effec-
tively crystallizes the claim into a property right. On the other hand, a 
rule premised on the harm an activity causes, and seeking to neutralize 
the same, without basing its normative legitimacy on any distributional 
pattern, simply does not have this effect. Thus, if A takes something 
away from B involuntarily; if the rule focuses on the harm B sustains in 
the taking and forces A to effect a reparation, the situation is materially 
different from one where the rule forces A to give the thing back to B, 
even if B has sustained no harm at all (or even benefited from the tak-
ing). The latter, a property rule, affirms B’s very claim over the thing, 
while the former, a liability rule, merely focuses on the immediate reality 
of damage and seeks to remedy it.23 
The difference between the two may appear overly subtle, given that 
the resource in question is often information, making the concepts of 
removal, taking, restoration and destruction, little more than metaphors. 
However, it is submitted that at the heart of the distinction lies the fact 
that in relation to a liability rule, the law focuses more on the nature of 
the defendant’s conduct than on the nature and form of the plaintiff’s 
                                                                                                                                 
 20. Over fifteen opinions of American courts have relied on this analysis, including 
several federal and state appellate decisions.  
 21. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 19, at 1092. 
 22. Id. 
 23. For a detailed exposition of the differences between the two regimes and their com-
parative merits and demerits in economic terms see Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property 
Rules versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 713, 757–73 (1996). 
See also A. Mitchell Polinsky, Controlling Externalities and Protecting Entitlements: Property 
Right, Liability Rule and Tax Subsidy Approaches, 8 J. Leg. Stud. 1 (1979); Robert C. Ellick-
son, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 
U Chi. L. Rev. 681; James E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, Property Rules and Liability Rules: 
The Cathedral in Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 440 (1995). 
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initial entitlement itself, performing a sanctioning role rather than a vin-
dicatory one in relation to the plaintiff’s interests.24 
Thus, in constructing a common law remedy, courts have the option 
of making the focus of their analyses, either the conduct of the defendant 
or the defined interest of the plaintiff. In the realm of informational use, 
we see common law courts in Australia and the UK favoring the former, 
in deference to legislatures, which they deem better-equipped to identify 
a protectable interest and the parameters of such protection. American 
courts on the other hand, seem to consider it inefficacious to focus solely 
on the conduct without defining the nature of the interest in question and 
in so doing, have often created novel proprietary interests.25 The doctrine 
of cybertrespass, as will become apparent, has evolved as a common law 
remedy. It thus merits examination whether the doctrine was evolved as 
a regulatory remedy, sanctioning the conduct of the defendant through an 
extrapolation of the doctrines of trespass to land and chattel or whether 
its emphasis lies in the creation of a new proprietary regime in a set of 
virtual resources. 
B. Tortious Remedies to Safeguard Proprietary Interests: 
The Case of Trespass 
Tort law in relation to property is said by Cane to perform what is re-
ferred to as a ‘vindicatory function’; i.e., the function of delineating the 
boundary between what is owned by one person and what isn’t. It is thus 
supposedly more concerned with the plaintiff’s actual interest, which it 
seeks to protect, than it is with the defendant’s conduct.26 Without getting 
into the debate of what exactly property is, let us assume for the mo-
ment, a working understanding that a proprietary interest is one which 
represents a set of rights and liabilities in relation to a resource. Given 
this vindicatory function, it is but logical that a tortious doctrine focusing 
on sanctioning a certain form of conduct in the belief that it protects the 
                                                                                                                                 
 24. Peter Cane defines the vindicatory function as that of demarcating the boundary 
between “what is mine and what is yours.” See Peter Cane, The Anatomy of Tort Law 
139 (1997). 
 25. Id. at 1093–98. It is indeed interesting to note that in delineating the factors that are 
often taken into consideration in choosing between a property and a liability rule for an inter-
est, Calabresi and Melamed list “economic efficiency” as the primary one—involving a 
determination of the administrative costs involved in enforcing the interest as well as the indi-
vidual transaction costs that may be incurred in effectuating the realisation of the interest on a 
regular basis. In this context, reference may be made to Holmes J.’s observations in E.I. Du 
Pont de Nemours Powder Co v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100 (1917), where he seemed to be allud-
ing to the fact that designating an interest as a proprietary one may be for reasons of analytical 
convenience. 
 26. Cane, supra note 24, at 139. 
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plaintiff’s proprietary interest, in fact serves to create, the very proprie-
tary interest it seeks to protect.27 It remains to be seen how true this is of 
the tort of trespass, as it is applied to both real property and movables, 
and of its virtual variant, cybertrespass.  
Trespass to real property or land—trespass quare clausum fregit, 
consists in the act of entering upon, remaining on or placing something 
on another’s land without sufficient justification.28 Interestingly, liability 
for trespass arises independent of any intention or knowledge on the part 
of the defendant. It is thus no defence for the defendant to plead that he 
was not aware of the boundaries of another’s property, as long as the en-
try itself was voluntary. Most importantly however, liability arises 
independent of any proof of damage to the plaintiff’s interests (or alter-
nately, damage is presumed to exist in the very act of trespass). This 
point is critical and raises the immediate question of why this is so. Why 
is trespass to land actionable iniuria sine damnum? The answer to this 
seems to lie in the value that the law places on the inviolability of real 
property—an interest that transcends monetary quantification, which a 
damage condition would necessarily require.29 This interest in inviolabil-
ity thus lies in protecting the owner’s possession from unwanted 
intrusions (i.e., a privacy interest). The underlying rationale would ap-
pear to be the belief that each intrusion operates as an indirect challenge 
to the plaintiff’s control over the resource in question, an element critical 
to establishing an ownership claim. 
Moving on now to movables; the tort of trespass to chattels is said to 
have been committed when one person without lawful justification en-
gages in any act of direct physical interference with goods in the 
possession of another.30 Obvious cases would thus include misappropria-
tion and willful physical damage. The question that however arises is 
whether, like its real property counterpart, this tortious action too be-
comes actionable per se, i.e., without any proof of actual damage. In 
other words, would any unjustified yet nominal physical contact with 
another’s movables amount to an act of actionable trespass, under this 
head? 
                                                                                                                                 
 27. Something Cane himself seems to concede, Id. at 78. 
 28. R.F.V. Heuston & R.A. Buckley, eds., Salmond and Heuston on the Law of 
Torts 40 (1996). 
 29. Id. at 41. See also Peter Cane, Tort Law and Economic Interests 32–33 
(1996). As the author observes, ‘actionability per se is important to the present discussion 
because it indicates that the tort of trespass protects interests other than economic interests. 
One of the most important of these interests is privacy.’ 
 30. Salmond, supra note 28, at 94. 
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Under English common law, the position appears to be that it would. 
According to Salmond, even an unauthorized touching would be an 
actionable trespass, since here too the law is concerned with the protec-
tion of the owner’s privacy (i.e., the inviolability interest).31 Fleming 
however believes that this isn’t necessarily the case, since the law is less 
concerned with the protection of mere dignitary interests in relation to 
movables.32 In this context, Fleming’s arguments seem to have more 
merit, for the following reason—if the rationale underlying the recogni-
tion of an inviolability/dignitary interest in a resource is that every 
nominal intrusion amounts to an affront to the owner’s control over it, 
this is necessarily diluted in the context of movables. Since the chattel is 
inherently capable of being subjected to de facto physical control (i.e., 
the characteristic of movability), there appears little necessity to add an 
additional layer of de jure control in a nominal sense. In the event that 
such de facto control is also interfered with, the issue becomes otiose, 
since it would immediately raise the issue of actual damage, because the 
interference would have deprived the owner of actual enjoyment, some-
thing a nominal interference would not. 
This of course doesn’t mean that the law is any less concerned with 
the inviolability of movable property than it is with the inviolability of 
land. It however reflects an element of pragmatism—that the law ought 
to step in only after recourse has been made to the element of self-help, 
intrinsic to the very idea of movables. 
Indeed, American tort law is exceptionally clear on this point. For an 
action to lie under the tort of trespass to chattel, the law mandates that 
the owner be dispossessed, that the chattel be impaired in condition, 
quality or value, that the possessor be deprived of use for a substantial 
time or that harm be caused to the possessor or a legally protected inter-
est of his.33 The reason for this is that the law permits an owner to use 
reasonable force to safeguard his interest in the chattel.34 There appears 
no reason to believe that the English common law is any different, in 
authorizing the use of a reasonable and proportional degree of force in 
self-defence.35 
                                                                                                                                 
 31. Id. at 95. Indeed, this is the position of the House of Lords in Leitch & Co v. Ley-
don, [1931] A.C. 90 (HL), where Lord Blanesburgh observed, “The wrong to the appellants in 
relation to that trespass is constituted whether or not actual damage has resulted therefrom 
either to the chattel or to themselves.” The House of Lords was of course relying on Pollock’s 
treatise on tort law. 
 32. John G. Fleming, The Law of Torts 59 (1998). 
 33. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 218 (1965). 
 34. Id. at § 218 cmt. e. 
 35. Salmond, supra note 28, at 129. 
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The crucial question however is whether this distinction in the pro-
tection of the inviolability interest has any bearing on the vindicatory 
function of demarcating the boundaries of ownership that the doctrine 
plays. In this regard, it is submitted that the element of per se actionabil-
ity is of less relevance than that of the strictness of the liability, in terms 
of the defendant’s mental state. If the law is to perform the function of 
defining the boundaries of a property interest (i.e., vindicatory role) ef-
fectively, it becomes critical for it to do the same without any regard for 
the defendant’s reasons for an action, as long as they can be causally at-
tributed to him, i.e., being voluntary in nature. The essence of the 
vindicatory role thus lies in presuming the existence of the proprietary 
interest as a matter of fact that operates in rem. To take a concrete exam-
ple; if the law were to define my proprietary interest in my land by 
holding liable a defendant who jumps onto it, it would make little differ-
ence to the contours of my interest to assess if the defendant did the 
same intending to trespass or knowing that the land was mine. This is 
because the very act of jumping onto my land challenges my control 
over it. If the defendant could thus avoid liability by showing that he 
didn’t intend to commit trespass or that he mistakenly believed the land 
to be his or that of a third party, the law would be focusing on sanction-
ing his conduct rather than defining my interest and cease to perform an 
exclusively vindicatory function.  
Both forms of trespass, as they stand today require an intentional in-
terference.36 This is however different from an independent requirement 
of intention. As long as the actor acts deliberately, the requirement is 
satisfied, with no subjective requirement for an intention to actually tres-
pass. The distinction is thus one between a subjectively intended action 
and an intentional action.37 Thus, a mistake as to the fact of ownership or 
the legal validity of the same has no bearing on the intentional nature of 
the act, while it would have had a bearing on an independent requirement 
of subjective intention; and consequently is inapplicable as a defence to an 
action for trespass.38 Therefore, the strict nature of liability in a trespass 
action accounts for its vindicatory function, since it presupposes the legal 
                                                                                                                                 
 36. Fleming, supra note 32, at 59; Salmond, supra note 28, at 41; Restatement, 
supra note 33, at § 217.  
 37. For a discussion of this difference, in the unrelated context of contractual intent, see 
generally David Goddar, The Myth of Subjectivity, 7 Legal Stud. 263 (1987); Timothy Endi-
cott, Objectivity, Subjectivity, and Incomplete Agreements, in Oxford Essays in 
Jurisprudence 151–71 (Jeremy Horder ed., 4th series, 2000).  
 38. Fleming, supra note 32, at 59; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 217 cmt. c 
(1965). 
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and factual existence of the proprietary right and sanctions any interfer-
ence with the same.  
One might seek to argue that the threshold requirement of intention-
ality too, detracts to some extent from the vindicatory function, in that it 
sets the proprietary protection at a level lower than an absolute one. 
However, it is submitted that this is an inevitable consequence of the fact 
that all tort law in any form, ultimately requires the existence of some 
correlativity between the plaintiff’s interest and the defendant’s actions.39 
In the absence of this correlativity, there would either be no reason to 
hold a particular defendant liable at all or to hold him liable to the par-
ticular plaintiff. The requirement of intentionality ensures that the 
conduct in question is legitimately the defendant’s, thereby safeguarding 
the element of correlativity, without which the basis of liability would 
cease to be tortious.  
In situations where the proprietary interest is itself ambiguously de-
fined (i.e., where the defendant would have no reason to suspect the 
factual or legal existence of a proprietary interest), the sequitur of this 
strict liability is that it effectively crystallizes the proprietary interest. 
This, it is submitted, is precisely what happened in the context of the 
doctrine of cybertrespass, which involved modifying the doctrine of 
trespass to chattels to suit the realities of the virtual world. 
C. The Evolution of Cybertrespass 
This part examines in some detail the doctrinal genesis of cybertres-
pass. The analysis is categorized into three parts, reflective of both the 
chronological development of the doctrine and the varied use of the doc-
trine itself. The first phase involved the move from the tangible to the 
virtual world and was critical in that it unknowingly set the standard for 
future expansion by preferring one metaphor to another. The second 
phase further crystallized the doctrine into an independent proprietary 
action and saw it being expanded to cover new areas, hitherto unfore-
seen. The third phase however generated a considerable degree of 
ambiguity and here one sees pushes in both directions—for a further ex-
pansion of the doctrine and for a considered roll-back of the same. 
Consequently, the present coverage of the doctrine remains somewhat 
unclear. 
                                                                                                                                 
 39. See generally, Ernest J. Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law ch. 5 (1995). 
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1. Electronic Trespass: From the Real to the 
Surreal and the Virtual 
While the doctrine of trespass to chattels has existed for quite a 
while, the first case that tested its applicability to new media was Thrifty-
Tel v. Bezenek,40 a case relating to the misuse of a telephone company’s 
network. In this case, the defendants’ son had employed a computer 
technology to crack the plaintiff company’s telephone access and au-
thorization codes, in order to use its network for long distance telephony 
without paying for the same. Initially, the plaintiff relied on the doctrine 
of conversion, but encountered the objection that conversion was ordi-
narily never applied to intangibles, since the action was premised on a 
dispossession, which often enough, could not be proven in the case of 
intangibles.41 The court then decided to consider whether the facts were 
sufficient to give rise to a cause of action that could accommodate the 
intangibility element involved and thereupon proceeded to examine the 
doctrine of trespass to chattels.  
Relying on Prosser’s observations that trespass to chattels had 
evolved into the ‘little brother’ of conversion and that it could arise from 
a mere interference or use, short of a dispossession, the court found the 
doctrine applicable to the facts of the case.42 What seemed to trouble the 
court however was the fact that the doctrine had hitherto never been ap-
plied to anything intangible. The court therefore went to some length to 
show how the element of tangibility had been relaxed in relation to the 
doctrine of trespass.43 The problem with its analysis however, was that all 
the authorities it cited to establish this point dealt with trespass to real 
property, and not with movables.44 As we noted in our previous discus-
sion, the law (American) makes a deliberate distinction between 
trespasses to movables and immovables, by requiring a tangible harm in 
the case of the former, but not in the latter. Consequently, it is under-
standable why an ephemeral intrusion would be actionable as trespass to 
real property; but it is indeed questionable whether the law ought to rec-
ognize the same in the context of movables as well. Nevertheless, the 
                                                                                                                                 
 40. 46 Cal.App.4th 1559, 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 468 (1996). 
 41. Id. at 1565–66. 
 42. Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts 85–86 (W. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 
1984). 
 43. Thrifty-Tel, 46 Cal.App.4th at 1567. 
 44. Wilson v. Interlake Steel Co., (1982) 32 Cal.3d 229, 185 Cal.Rptr. 280, 649 P.2d 
922; Roberts v. Permanente Corp. (1961) 188 Cal.App.2d 526, 10 Cal.Rptr. 519 (both dealing 
with dust particles); Bradley v. American Smelting and Refining Co. (1985) 104 Wash.2d 677, 
709 P.2d 782 (dealing with microscopic airborne particles). 
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court concluded that ‘electronic signals’ were ‘tangible enough’ to con-
stitute trespass.45  
Surprisingly, the court also side-stepped the entire issue of requiring 
the plaintiff to show ‘actual damage’ for the cause of action to arise at all. 
In its discussion, the court categorically observed that the plaintiff ‘pre-
sented no evidence of any actual losses’.46 One is therefore left wondering 
why the court’s analysis of the doctrine appeared prima facie perfunc-
tory. The answer may well lie in the court’s perceived need to find some 
doctrine to overcome the tangibility restriction it encountered in relation 
to conversion. The doctrine of trespass seemed to provide the best an-
swer. The court should have stopped here and proceeded with caution in 
maintaining the subtle doctrinal divide that existed between movables 
and immovables. Instead, in its zeal to find an independent cause of ac-
tion it conflated the two.  
In making the transition from the material to the virtual world of 
electronic signals, the court in Thrifty-Tel assumed that the metaphor of 
chattels was most appropriate to the situation. The assumption that in-
tangible resources, such as information or electronic signals can be more 
aptly regulated using legal doctrines governing chattels than through 
those applicable to land, seemed to be at the root of the court’s choice of 
metaphor. In a sense, had it chosen to analyze the situation in terms of 
landed interests—that the telephone network itself was more analogous 
to real property than it was to personal property, in being incapable of 
actual physical control at all times, the metaphor of trespass to land 
might have been more suitably employed, avoiding the conceptual con-
fusion that the court seems to have gotten itself into. This problem was 
only exacerbated when the law came to be applied to the Internet.  
This happened the very next year. In CompuServe v. Cyber Promo-
tions, Inc,47 an online service provider brought an action against a 
company that was in the business of sending unsolicited email adver-
tisements, alleging that by doing so through its (i.e., plaintiff’s) servers 
and to its customers, it was committing trespass to chattels. Following 
from the Thrifty-Tel opinion, the court here observed that the require-
ments for trespass to chattels were much less stringent than those 
required for a conversion claim and that a substantial interference with 
possession was not required to establish the former. All the same, the 
                                                                                                                                 
 45. Thrifty-Tel, 46 Cal.App.4th at1567. 
 46. Id. at 1564. All the same, it notes that the defendants’ actions resulted in the tying 
up of the company’s system. One wonders whether this line of analysis ought to have been 
carried a little further to examine whether the ‘tying-up’ was tantamount to a dispossession or 
whether it caused any material damage to the system or its resources. 
 47. 962 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (hereinafter Compuserve). 
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court appeared conscious of the restriction placed on the doctrine by the 
requirement of actual damage and that the plaintiff had to show harm to 
the property or a diminution in its quality, condition or value as a result 
of the defendant’s actions.48  
On the basis of the plaintiff’s allegation, the court found two types of 
damage to exist. The first was that the multiple email messages occupied 
a large amount of disk space on the plaintiff’s servers and were a drain 
on their processing power. This, according to the court diminished the 
value of the equipment to the plaintiff, even though there was no physi-
cal damage.49 The second form of damage, according to the court lay in 
the fact that since the defendant’s emails were directed through the 
plaintiff’s servers at the plaintiff’s customers, it had caused several of 
these customers to complain about the plaintiff’s very service. Conse-
quently, the court found this to be an interference with the plaintiff’s 
reputation and goodwill, a legally protected interest, actionable under the 
doctrine as well.50 
On the first form of damage, the court’s reasoning appears conspicu-
ously flawed. To begin with, the court overcomes the physical tangibility 
requirement by concluding that electronic signals were sufficiently tan-
gible for the purposes of trespass. Therefore, the routing of electronic 
mail messages through the plaintiff was a form of physical contact. All 
the same, the court reasoned that the plaintiff’s servers were impaired by 
their receipt of multiple e-mail messages. But these messages are what 
the servers are built to handle fundamentally (therefore making the situa-
tion materially different from sending smoke onto another’s land). What 
brings about the impairment is not so much the contact itself (i.e., the 
signals), but the consequence of the contact and the fact that they were 
unwanted by their intended recipients.  
The impairment condition in trespass exists as a physical require-
ment—i.e., that the contact itself must have directly caused the 
impairment. In the CompuServe case it wasn’t the factum of the contact 
that was causing the impairment, but an allied consequence—i.e., not the 
messages themselves but the unwanted nature of what was contained in 
the messages. The distinction lies in that a factual-contact requirement is 
an objective determination (of causality), while a consequence-driven 
one renders the determination subjective and incompatible with the 
physical-nature of the requirement. Thus, the plaintiff would have been 
unlikely to complain, in the event that its customers did indeed derive 
                                                                                                                                 
 48. Id. at 1021–23. The court here made reference to § 218 of the Restatement: Re-
statement, supra note 33, at § 218. 
 49. Id. at 1022. 
 50. Id. at 1023. 
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value from the messages they received from the defendant. It was thus 
more the content of the messages, rather than the very sending that the 
plaintiffs were unhappy about. Apart from this is of course the obvious 
issue that when the law mandates a diminution in value, it requires the 
same objectively. If the requirement were merely that the value of the 
resource to its owner be diminished, it would render the very require-
ment moot, something which the court appears to have overlooked.51 
Coming to the second form of damage found by the court, here too 
the law appears to require that the interference with a legal interest be a 
form of physical harm flowing from the initial harm.52 Further, it remains 
open to debate whether the allowance made for harm to good-
will/reputation is sufficiently direct, as required by the law. 
The court in CompuServe, was presented with the problem of adopt-
ing a suitable metaphor to develop a regulatory framework dealing with 
unwanted mass electronic mails, and it chose that of chattels, i.e., mov-
ables. While it is true that in a sense, the Internet is composed of 
innumerable individual computer servers, each of which is the personal 
property of its owner, it remains possible to analyze the Internet as an 
independently existent space.53 In deciding to focus on the private owner-
ship of the constituent elements of the Internet, the CompuServe court 
consciously decided to limit its analysis to movables. In so doing how-
ever, the court failed to recognize that the law adopts different standards 
for chattels and landed interests, deriving from their inherent properties. 
Moved by the relative ease of recognizing the Internet as little more than 
its movable elements—movables, while at the same time seeking to 
transpose the legal standard for immovables to it, the court’s analysis 
appears doctrinally flawed.  
From another perspective however, the court’s reluctance to analyze 
the Internet as an immovable place may have derived from a genuine 
concern with the unregulability of the Internet as a whole. If the court 
had headed down the path of analyzing the Internet as a form of realty, it 
would have had to grapple with the fundamental issue of ownership (i.e., 
who owns the space in question?) and its incidents (i.e., what are the 
consequences of owning a space on the Internet? Is it to exclude all oth-
                                                                                                                                 
 51. The Restatement does however recognise special situations where an interference 
not affecting the physical condition of the chattel may effectively destroy the value of the 
chattel to the possessor, rendering it actionable—e.g., where a toothbrush is used by another 
person or where an intimate piece of clothing is worn by another. These seem to be recognised 
however as exceptions to the general rule. See Restatement, supra note 33, at § 218 cmt. h. 
 52. For a detailed discussion, see Burk, supra note 4, at 34–36. 
 53. For an overview of the implications of the same, see Hunter, supra note 4; Lemley, 
supra note 4.  
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ers from entering?). Many of these questions have arisen in relation to 
the issue of domain names, but in the completely different framework of 
trademark law.54 
One of the consequences of adopting a realty-based analysis would 
have been the implications it has for the ‘public forum’ doctrine. In its 
simplest form, the doctrine stipulates that in relation to certain places 
which have traditionally been used by the public to communicate and 
exchange ideas and information, the public has certain affirmative rights, 
privileges and liberties to use the same for such communication and ex-
change.55 In a 1996 case, a United States Supreme Court justice had 
openly observed that the time may be ripe to consider the implications of 
extending the public forum doctrine to new communications media.56 
Consequently, had the court decided to analyze ownership of the Internet 
as a whole, it would have had to consider directly, some of these contro-
versial implications that such an analysis would have invariably had and 
which were alluded to by the defendants in the course of their argu-
ments.57 In this reading then, the court’s choice of metaphor was 
prompted by a sense of avoidance. 
The CompuServe court’s analysis thus provided a precedent for 
plaintiffs seeking to find a new cause of action to control unwanted bulk 
emails.58 By focusing on the actual use of the individual server, reasoning 
that electronic signals were physical enough and concluding that the 
very usage and its subsequent consequences were sufficient damage for 
the purposes of actionability, the court effectively adapted the common 
law cause of trespass to chattels to the digital world. By failing to main-
tain the bright line divide between trespass to realty and chattels that the 
                                                                                                                                 
 54. See generally Victoria Holstein–Childress, Lex Cyberus: The UDRP As A Gate-
keeper To Judicial Resolution Of Competing Rights To Domain Names, 109 Penn. St. L. Rev. 
565 (2004). 
 55. See Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939). 
 56. In Denver Area Education Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 
(1996), Kennedy J observes: 
Minds are not changed in streets and parks as they once were. To an increasing de-
gree, the more significant interchanges of ideas and shaping of public 
consciousness occur in mass and electronic media . . . The extent of public entitle-
ment to participate in those means of communication may be changed as 
technologies change.  
See also Noah D. Zatz, Sidewalks in Cyberspace: Making Space for Public Forums in the 
Electronic Environment, 12 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 149 (1998) (discussing the broader implica-
tions of such an expansion). 
 57. Indeed, some of the observations of the CompuServe court indicate a general aver-
sion to dealing with issues of Internet regulation. See CompuServe, 962 F. Supp. at 1026. 
 58. See generally, Steven E. Bennett, Canning Spam: Compuserve, Inc. v. Cyber–
Promotions, Inc., 32 U. Rich. L. Rev. 545 (1998). 
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law had, for centuries, it was obvious that it would only be a matter of 
time before other instances necessitated courts to head even further down 
the slippery slope—effectively rendering the requirements of cybertres-
pass analogous to those of trespass to land. 
Two cases followed the CompuServe decision with similar facts and 
analyses.59 In both these cases an Internet service provider had com-
menced an action against defendants who were sending out bulk emails 
using the provider’s server to the provider’s own customers. The courts 
decided that the operators’ conduct amounted to trespass to chattels and 
granted the providers injunctions, restraining the same. Carrying on from 
where the CompuServe court left off, in both these cases the court took 
for granted that the use of the provider’s network and the resultant harm 
to goodwill were sufficient damage to satisfy the harm requirement in 
relation to chattels. Indeed, neither court based its conclusions on any-
thing more than the plaintiff’s assertions that such damage had been 
sustained.60 
It thus became glaringly obvious to anyone that it was only a matter 
of time before the ‘harm’ element became little more than a nominal re-
quirement, serving no purpose other than to justify the origins of 
cybertrespass—as emanating from the doctrine of trespass to chattels. 
Recent trends seem to corroborate the same. In the recent case of Tyco 
International (US), Inc v. Does,61 the defendants had loaded the plain-
tiff’s servers with over 30,000 email messages and were restrained from 
continuing their activities, under the doctrine of trespass to chattels. In-
terestingly, the court here awarded the plaintiff nominal compensatory 
damages of $1. The court based this award on the reasoning that the 
plaintiff had failed to demonstrate or claim any loss or damage to its sys-
tems as a result of the defendants’ actions.62 This is indeed surprising. By 
its own admission, the court seemed to be concluding that it found 
against the existence of any tangible harm or damage, but it nevertheless 
proceeded to conclude the cause of action itself to have been made out. 
Instead of concluding that the lack of harm necessitated only nominal 
compensation, the court should have found that this fact alone militated 
against the plaintiff’s trespassory claim. 
                                                                                                                                 
 59. America Online, Inc. v. IMS, 24 F. Supp. 2d 548 (E.D. Va. 1998) (hereinafter 
AOL–I); America Online, Inc. v. LCGM, Inc., 46 F. Supp.2d 444 (E.D. Va. 1998) (hereinafter 
AOL–II). Interestingly, both cases were decided by the same District Court. 
 60. AOL–I, 24 F. Supp.2d at 550; AOL–II, 46 F. Supp.2d at 452. It may of course have 
been determined by the fact that both cases involved motions for summary judgement by the 
plaintiff. 
 61. 2003 WL 23374767 (S.D.N.Y.). 
 62. Id. at 3–4. 
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This case only makes clear the conceptual obfuscation that was im-
minent in the CompuServe court’s reasoning. By setting a doctrinally 
unclear precedent in the early stages of the law’s development, the court 
unknowingly added a taint of legitimacy to the doctrine itself being ex-
tended, mutated and applied to factual circumstances it hadn’t initially 
envisaged. 
2. From Web Space to Information: Ebay and Register.com 
One of the first few areas where one observed the expansion of the 
doctrine of cybertrespass, following the CompuServe case was in relation 
to actual web-site content. Traditionally, content has always been the 
subject matter of established intellectual property rights—most notably 
copyright. However, these rights, including copyright are subject to a 
plethora of limitations—relating to the subject matter and duration of 
their coverage.63 In order to ensure that these limitations are not evaded 
through a mix of contract and property rules by individual actors, 
American copyright law further recognizes a doctrine known as ‘pre-
emption’. The doctrine of federal copyright pre-emption, as it is known, 
mandates that no person is entitled to assert any claim in relation to a 
right that is the equivalent of an exclusive right conferred by copyright, 
outside the realm of copyright law itself.64 Consequently, for factual 
compilations or information databases that do not qualify for copyright 
protection, claims outside of copyright are ordinarily barred; unless such 
claims assert an ‘extra element’ that take them beyond the coverage of 
the ordinary exclusive rights available under copyright.65  
As a consequence, when the doctrine of cybertrespass came to be 
pleaded in relation to website content, the first question that arose was 
whether the claim was necessarily pre-empted by copyright law. In 
Ticketmaster Corp v. Tickets.Com Inc,66 the plaintiff owned a web-site 
that sold tickets for different events online. For these events, it usually 
had the exclusive right to sell tickets on the Internet. The defendant was 
a service that listed events date-wise and where it did not directly sell 
tickets for the same online, it provided a link to the interior web-page on 
the plaintiff’s site that listed the event with its details and enabled the 
                                                                                                                                 
 63. For instance, copyright is said to subsist only in the expression of an idea and never 
in the idea itself. Mere facts are similarly not protectable under copyright. Further, to qualify 
for protection under copyright, a work needs to meet the requirement of originality and in 
some cases an additional requirement of creativity as well.  
 64. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a). 
 65. See generally Schuyler Moore, Straightening out Copyright Preemption, 9 
U.C.L.A. Ent. L. Rev. 201 (2002); Marc S. Williams, Copyright Preemption: Real–time Dis-
semination of Sports Scores and Information, 71 S. Cal. L. Rev. 445 (1998). 
 66. 2000 WL 525390 (C.D. Cal.). 
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customer to buy the ticket (but from the plaintiff). By clicking on this 
link, the customer was taken directly into the interior of the plaintiff’s 
web site and did not have to navigate his way all over again when he 
reached the site. The plaintiff commenced an action against the 
defendant alleging copyright infringement and among other claims, 
raised a common law claim for trespass to chattels, since the link was in 
essence connecting the defendant’s site to the plaintiff’s. The court 
however dismissed the trespass claim, finding it to be pre-empted by 
federal copyright law, since the essence of the action was that the 
defendant had appropriated (i.e., copied) information from the plaintiff’s 
own page.67  
In Ticketmaster, the court managed to block the trespass claim since 
the only form of connection (physical, or otherwise) the plaintiff alleged 
was a hypertext link to its site, which the court in turn reasoned had 
more to do with the actual content of the site, than the method of contact 
itself. Had the method of contact or information collection been more 
elaborate and perceptibly invasive, the court may well have found the 
claim to be applicable, since it would have then related more to the 
means deployed in collecting the information than to the consequence of 
the collection, i.e., copying. This is precisely what happened in the case 
of eBay, Inc v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc,68 where the plaintiff managed to struc-
ture the claim as one relating to the very means of information collection 
and thereby succeeded in downplaying the copying or misappropriation 
element involved.69  
The plaintiff in that case, owned and operated an online auction site, 
which offers sellers the ability to list their items for sale on its site and 
prospective buyers the ability in turn to search the listings and place bids 
on items. The item is then sold to the highest bidder, with the transaction 
taking place directly through the buyer and the seller, with the plaintiff 
having no involvement in this process.70 The defendant in turn operated 
an auction aggregation website, which offered online auction buyers the 
facility of searching for items across numerous online auction sites (in-
cluding eBay) without having to visit each site individually. For this 
purpose, and to expedite the recovery of information, the defendant site 
maintained its own searchable database. Information for this database, 
consisting of the details of the various current bids, was collected by the 
                                                                                                                                 
 67. Id. at 4. 
 68. 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal., 2000). 
 69. See generally Edward W. Chang, Bidding on Trespass: Ebay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, 
Inc. and the Abuse of Trespass Theory in Cyberspace–Law, 29 AIPLA Quart. J. 445 (2001). 
 70. For a general overview of how the eBay site works, see Adam Cohen, The Per-
fect Store: Inside eBay (2002). 
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defendant by deploying ‘electronic spiders’. In their simplest form, elec-
tronic spiders are computer programs that query other computers over 
the Internet for large quantities of information;71 they thus automate the 
process of information collection. It is important to note that the infor-
mation itself, is neither confidential (being available to the public which 
visits the auction site itself) nor proprietary, consisting of purely factual 
data. Initially, the defendant had sought and obtained permission from 
the plaintiff to collect this information using its spiders. Subsequently 
however, negotiations between the parties fell through and the plaintiff 
proceeded to commence an action against the defendant, alleging that the 
defendant’s continued deployment of spiders to collect information from 
its site, without its permission and in spite of its communications to the 
defendant to cease such collections, violated its rights.72 Among numer-
ous causes it claimed for, was that of trespass to chattels. 
At the district court, the plaintiff seemed to put forth the argument 
that there were no good reasons for treating websites and Internet servers 
any different from ordinary realty. Indeed the same argument was to be 
made later in an amicus brief filed in favor of the plaintiff after the dis-
trict court delivered its opinion. The brief argued that this allowed the 
owner to internalize the costs connected with the resource itself and en-
abled him to create various proprietary interests (i.e., easements, 
licenses, leases, etc.) in relation to the site.73 Surprisingly, the court 
seemed to accept this theory, at least partially. 
Carrying on from the reasoning in Thrifty-Tel and CompuServe, the 
court concluded that the electronic signals sent by the defendant onto the 
plaintiff’s site were sufficiently tangible to support the cause of action. It 
then proceeded to establish that the defendant’s activities were unauthor-
ized—both expressly by the communication it had received from the 
plaintiff and tacitly, by the terms of the site’s usage. Acknowledging that 
the crux of the action lay in showing an intermeddling with the plaintiff’s 
possessory interest, and at the same time conceding that the level of inter-
ference required to constitute an intermeddling was uncertain, it concluded 
                                                                                                                                 
 71. Also referred to as software robots, robots, spiders or webcrawlers. In recent times, 
the shortened word ‘bot’ is usually used to refer to an electronic spider of the nature described 
above. 
 72. It is important to note that the plaintiff’s web site contained a set of terms and con-
ditions, one of which stated expressly that the use of robots to copy content from the site 
without prior permission was prohibited. eBay, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1060. 
 73. See generally Brief of Amicus Curiae eBay 100 F. Supp.2d at 67. Among those who 
worked on this brief was Prof. Richard Epstein, a renowned professor in the field of law and 
economics. For an overview of Epstein’s views on the subject, see Epstein, supra note 6; Ep-
stein, supra note 5, at 818–21. 
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that the defendant’s actions amounted to a use of the plaintiff’s computer 
systems, sufficient to constitute an intermeddling for trespass to apply.74  
Recognizing that the element of damage was crucial for a claim of 
trespass to chattels to succeed, the court concluded that the defendant’s 
very use of the plaintiff’s system, however minimal it may have been, used 
valuable bandwidth and capacity and thereby deprived the plaintiff of us-
ing the same at the same time. It further observed that if it were to hold 
otherwise, it would only encourage other aggregators to send spiders onto 
the plaintiff’s site thereby actually affecting the functioning of the site. 
The court seems to have taken into consideration the additional element 
of potential harm as well, in assessing damage.75 
In a sense, the court’s ruling in eBay seems to bring down in its en-
tirety, the conceptual divide between trespass to chattels and realty that 
previous courts had sought to maintain, at least nominally. Its observa-
tion that “the law recognizes no such right to use another’s personal 
property”76 aptly illustrates this point. As noted earlier, in an action for 
trespass to chattels, the law’s concern is not with the nominal inviolabil-
ity of the owner’s right, since the owner is privileged to use reasonable 
force to safeguard his asset. Consequently, a mere use without any 
physical harm would not be actionable, unless the resource in question is 
realty.  
It remains conspicuously clear from the court’s reasoning that it was 
moved by the apparent unfairness of the defendant’s free-riding on the 
plaintiff’s information and the possible economic effect this might have 
on the latter’s business. It therefore needed to find the defendant’s con-
duct actionable per se. One therefore fails to realize why it didn’t opt to 
analyze the case in terms analogous to an action for trespass to land, 
more so since this doctrine was raised before it as an alternative. This 
isn’t to imply that adopting the trespass to land doctrine would have 
solved all problems; just that it would have avoided the conceptual con-
flation that the court’s reasoning has given rise to. 
The eBay court’s recognition of an exclusionary right in relation to 
the plaintiff’s compilation of information also had the effect of according 
proprietary protection to an informational resource for which intellectual 
property protection had for a while been a controversial subject—
databases and compilations. The position of US law since the 1990s has 
been that mere compilations of information are not protectable under 
                                                                                                                                 
 74. eBay, 100 F. Supp.2d at 1070. 
 75. Id. at 1071–72. 
 76. Id. at 1071. 
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copyright law unless they involve an element of creativity.77 Ordinarily, 
one might have thought that the cause would have been pre-empted by 
federal copyright law. The court however expressly noted that this was 
not the case since the trespassory cause of action here focused on the 
misuse of the plaintiff’s physical property (i.e., its servers) and conse-
quently, consisted of an extra element that ensured its sustainability.78  
A sequitur of the court’s reasoning, likening use to harm is that it 
renders palpably legitimate uses of a website actionable at the fancy of 
the website owner. Most web-based search engines today collect infor-
mation for their databases using electronic spiders, which they 
periodically send out to retrieve information.79 Ordinarily, a spider ac-
cessing a web-site is expected to check whether it is authorized to collect 
information before it actually crawls any deeper. Sometimes however, 
the spider doesn’t carry out this check—either purposively80 (as pro-
grammed) or owing to a malfunction. In each of these cases, the owner 
of the website, going by the eBay court’s reasoning could hold the search 
engine liable for cybertrespass, even in the absence of any palpable 
harm. 
By placing the onus on a user to verify whether a certain mode of 
accessing the website was permissible at all, the court was in effect 
erecting an artificial fence around the website, the crossing of which 
would give rise to a trespassory claim. As Steve Fisher notes, this 
changes the fundamental operative paradigm of the Internet. The Inter-
net, ever since its creation, has been premised on a culture of openness—
                                                                                                                                 
 77. This position is indeed unique to the United States, following the decision of its 
Supreme Court in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 
(1991).  
In an amicus brief filed by a group of 28 law professors on behalf of the defendant, when 
the case was taken on appeal to the Ninth Circuit, this argument was pressed again, with the 
explicit observation that the creation of such a right ought to be the prerogative of a legislative 
body and not a judicial forum.  
 78. eBay, 100 F. Supp.2d at 1072. For a general overview of the legal issues involved in 
the proprietary protection of valuable pricing information, see Maureen A. O’Rourke, Shaping 
Competition on the Internet: Who Owns Product and Pricing Information?, 53 Van. L. Rev. 
1965 (2000). 
 79. See Danny Sullivan, How Search Engines Work, http://searchenginewatch. 
internet.com/webmasters/ work.html (last visited February 10, 2005). 
 80. As was the case with Bidder’s Edge, eBay, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1062. A spider/robot 
accessing a website to retrieve information ordinarily verifies the command lines of a file 
called—“robot.txt” before it proceeds any further on a site. The nature of information it is 
permitted to retrieve and which it is to omit is to be specified therein. Importantly though, the 
robots.txt process, detailed in a self-regulatory document called the “Robot Exclusion Stan-
dard” is not an official standard, nor is it a part of web sites’ terms of use and access. 
Consequently, a non-adherence to the standard, i.e., not making the spider check the text of 
robots.txt, while contrary to settled best practices, is not illegal or actionable on its own. 
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where access has been presumed to be the de facto rule, with individual 
actors being given the choice of ‘opting out’ by adopting bright-line exclu-
sionary techniques (such as encryption, passwords, authentication 
techniques and the like).81 The court’s reasoning effectively alters this. By 
creating a ‘presumptive fence’, which a user was now legally obligated to 
look out for, the default rule was being altered to one of less than com-
plete openness.  
The decision in eBay all but eliminated the harm requirement in cy-
bertrespass, thereby bringing into question its continued conceptual 
affiliation with the doctrine of trespass to chattels. Reasoning in almost 
identical terms was adopted by the court in another decision that fol-
lowed shortly after eBay—Register.Com, Inc v. Verio, Inc82 The plaintiff 
there, Register.com was an Internet domain name registrar, which also 
offered its customers website creating and hosting facilities. All domain 
name registrars, were in turn required to provide an online WHOIS data-
base—a searchable database consisting of the names and contact details 
of all customers who had registered their domain names through the reg-
istrar in question. Registrars were also mandated to make this database 
freely accessible to the public through the Internet. Accordingly, Regis-
ter.com maintained one such database.83  
The defendant, though not a registrar, provided registrants with fa-
cilities to develop and host their own websites. It thus competed directly 
with the plaintiff, in the post-registration market. To enhance its own 
market, it began an operation which involved downloading a list of 
newly registered domain names from a central server. Once the names 
were retrieved for each day, it then deployed a search robot which queried 
the central server to determine the name of the registrar with whom the 
domain was registered and then automatically proceeded to query the 
WHOIS database of the concerned registrar to obtain the contact details of 
the registrant. The plaintiff was one such registrar queried by the defen-
dant’s robots. Concerned that the defendant was effectively free-riding on 
its own work, the plaintiff brought an action against Verio, alleging nu-
merous causes including trespass to chattels.84 
                                                                                                                                 
 81. Fischer, supra note 4, at 168–70. Fischer also provides a detailed analysis of how 
different electronic robots and spiders operate, how they are deployed by agents on the Inter-
net and technical options that exist to exclude them without resorting to a legal trespassory 
rule. 
 82. 126 F. Supp. 2d. 238 (S.D.N.Y., 2000). 
 83. Id. at 241–42. 
 84. Id. at 243. The other causes of action included breach of contract, a claim under the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and another under the provisions of the Lanham Act for 
falsely designating origin. 
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The court’s reasoning on the trespassory claim was almost identical 
to that of the eBay court, which it relied on extensively. The court ob-
served that the defendant’s use of robots to access the plaintiff’s system 
resulted in a diminution of the latter’s system resources—the extent to 
which was, of course, uncertain. This was the same as saying that the 
harm lay in the very use, since any use effectively results in some dimi-
nution of system resources (the system itself, being of finite capacity). 
The court then concluded that a mere showing of possessory interfer-
ence was sufficient to establish harm and accordingly proceeded to find 
that the plaintiff had succeeded in establishing the existence of trespass (to 
chattels).85 This makes it unambiguously clear that the court was insistent 
on adopting a ‘trespass to land’ standard in its analysis. The reasoning 
and decision of the district court was unanimously affirmed, on appeal.86 
The district court’s decision however raises several issues, which the ap-
pellate court did not examine in any detail.  
For one, why didn’t the court resort to a land-analogy for websites 
explicitly, without interpreting the law as it did, to effectively render re-
dundant the chattel-realty divide? We can put aside our speculative 
inquiry into the reasons for the court’s reluctance for later and conclude 
by noting that the eBay and Register.com cases had the effect of crystal-
lizing the evolution of a new proprietary remedy on the Internet, in 
relation to websites; a remedy that related not just to the appropriation of 
content, but one that related to the very use and access of parts of the 
Internet. 
3. Recognizing The Doctrinal Ambiguity: Hamidi and After 
A plain reading of the eBay and Register.com decisions would lend 
support to the argument that the courts had all but abandoned the re-
quirement of actual damage in favor of a ‘mere use’ test of possessory 
interference. Indeed this is precisely how a few subsequent decisions 
interpreted these cases as well. In Oyster Software, Inc v. Forms Process-
ing, Inc,87 the defendant had made use of the plaintiff’s trademark name 
in its metatags, thereby causing search engines to link to the wrong site. 
In dealing with the plaintiff’s claim that the defendant’s actions consti-
tuted a trespass to chattels, the court concluded in express terms that 
after eBay, in relation to electronic trespass, the law no longer required a 
showing of substantial interference and that a minimal element of pos-
                                                                                                                                 
 85. Id. at 250. 
 86. Register.Com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 87. 2001 WL 1736382 (N.D. Cal.). 
BALGANESH TYPE.DOC 10/2/2006  2:08 PM 
292 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 12:265 
 
sessory interference or ‘use’ would suffice to establish the claim.88 This 
interpretation, while eminently problematic conceptually, was neverthe-
less an accurate restatement of the judicial development of the law. In 
more recent times however, courts have disputed this interpretation, 
while at the same time reaffirming the approach in eBay, thereby making 
their own contribution to the existent doctrinal ambiguity.  
Ken Hamidi, a former Intel engineer, formed an organization to dis-
seminate views and information critical of Intel’s employment and 
personnel practices. The organization maintained a website and over a 
period of under two years sent all of Intel’s employees six mass emails, 
criticizing Intel’s practices and urging employees to move to another 
company. Each of these messages was sent to about 35,000 addresses. 
When Intel tried blocking several of them, Hamidi managed to evade the 
blockade by using an alternate computer to send them. Intel then sent 
Hamidi a message asking him to stop sending out mass emails to its em-
ployees; but he responded that he had the right to communicate what he 
felt and continued to send out mass mails. Intel then brought an action 
against Hamidi and his organization, alleging trespass to chattels and 
sought an injunction against them. 
At the first instance, the court found in favor of Intel, reasoning that 
trespass to chattels required a showing of ‘unauthorized use’, which had 
been established here.89 It accordingly issued a permanent injunction re-
straining the defendants from sending unsolicited emails to the plaintiff’s 
computer systems. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the injunc-
tion.90 Its reasoning is however of interest. The court undertook a detailed 
examination of the doctrine of trespass to movables and the manner in 
which authors and past judicial decisions had interpreted the doctrine. In 
specific it noted the divergence that existed between the approaches in 
England and the United States, discussed earlier.91 The court then 
reached the startling conclusion that the divergence was irrelevant, once 
the nature of remedy sought shifted from damages to an injunction. It 
had thus interpreted the requirement of actual damage, integral to the 
                                                                                                                                 
 88. Id. at 13. As the court observed: 
While the eBay decision could be read to require an interference that was more than 
negligible (as did the court in Ticketmaster), this Court concludes that eBay, in fact, 
imposes no such requirement. Ultimately, the court in that case concluded that the 
defendant’s conduct was sufficient to establish a cause of action for trespass not be-
cause the interference was ‘substantial’ but simply because the defendant’s conduct 
amounted to ‘use’ of Plaintiff’s computer. 
 89. Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 1999 WL 450944 (Cal. App. Super.). 
 90. Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 114 Cal.Rptr.2d 244 (2001) (Hamidi–II). 
 91. See supra notes 31–39 and accompanying text. 
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American doctrine as emanating from the law’s reluctance to award 
nominal damages for a trespass to a movable. In the court’s reading, 
once it was made clear that the plaintiff was not seeking damages at all, 
but an equitable remedy instead (as Intel was), then the issue of actual 
damage became moot altogether.92 
This raises an interesting question—whether the self-help pre-
condition implicit in an action for trespass to chattels has some connection 
only with a claim for monetary damages. From one perspective, the condi-
tion relates to and derives from the nature of the resource in question (i.e., 
a movable) and therefore has little to do with the nature of remedy sought. 
From another reading (presumably, the court’s), by seeking an injunctive 
remedy, the plaintiff was conceding that self-help measures hadn’t 
worked to curtail the trespass. Consequently, there was no need to insist 
on an actual damage requirement since the inadequacy of self-help was 
central to the very remedy sought. On closer analysis, the injunctive 
remedy argument actually reinforces the requirement for a showing of 
actual damage. This is because before being granted injunctive relief, 
plaintiffs are required to show actual or potential damage that cannot be 
compensated by monetary damages. Presumably, a failure to show that a 
possessory interference had resulted in actual (present) damage would 
lead to a conclusion against the occurrence of such damage in the future 
as well, resulting in the denial of the injunction.  
Further, a distinction ought to be drawn between situations where the 
damage is inherently incompensable (the standard for injunctive relief) 
and those where the damage is legally incompensable (nominal dam-
ages—never awarded in a trespassory action). The court seems to have 
equated the two to derive a general reluctance in the law to award dam-
ages for a trespassory action and conclude that since the law prefers self-
help to damages wherever possible, so too should it prefer injunctive 
relief to damages. This conclusion is absurd, since the law bases the 
award of an injunction on the incommensurability of potential damage, 
while its preference for self-help derives from the presumptive immate-
riality of the damage. The categories of incommensurability and 
immateriality are indeed distinct—one derives from the impossibility of 
assessment and the other from the triviality of the assessment.93 
What the court was thus implicitly saying was that a claim for an in-
junction (instead of damages) obviated the need for primary recourse to 
self-help as an enforcement mechanism. This point merits some discus-
                                                                                                                                 
 92. Hamidi-II, supra note 90, at 249. 
 93. It could of course be argued that when analysed in economic terms, the law’s choice 
is the same in both cases. 
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sion. At the core of the debate lies the question whether the element of 
self-help relates more to the nature of remedy ordinarily sought (i.e., 
damages) than it does to the nature of the resource (i.e., movability) or 
vice-versa. Richard Epstein seeks to undertake this inquiry by examining 
whether the fact that the law does not allow a trespassory claim (over 
chattels) without damage is an indication of its non-actionability (i.e., a 
remedial issue) or alternatively, of the fact that it is not altogether a 
trespass, legally.94 If the element of actual damage is indeed a remedial 
issue (as also its corollary, self-help), it would leave intact the fact that a 
trespass had actually occurred and thereby enable a court to vindicate the 
right infracted by modeling an alternative remedy, presumably an equi-
table one (i.e., an injunction). If on the other hand, the issue were indeed 
a substantive one—rendering the defendant’s action itself short of tres-
pass, then no novel remedy would be permissible. Epstein seems to 
conclude that the actual damage issue relates to the actionability of the 
wrong, the wrong itself deriving from the inviolate nature of any proprie-
tary interest.95 While the apparent dichotomy between American and 
English law on the point of actual damage may actually buttress this 
conclusion, yet, the matter may not be as straight-forward as it is made 
out to be. 
Conceptually, property is generally understood as a bundle of rights, 
with the right to exclude often characterized as the most important right 
within that bundle. Indeed, some even argue that the right to exclude is 
the basis on which all conceptions of property revolve.96 In this reading, 
property is less of a ‘thing’, than it is a right (or collection of rights)—a 
right to a resource, characterized by a right to exclude others from that 
resource. In the absence of this exclusionary element (i.e., if the right 
were merely one of use/access), it would make little sense to talk of 
property rights, since there would be nothing to distinguish public and 
private ownership. It is precisely this point that James Harris makes 
when he notes that the term ‘common property’ is in reality a misnomer 
in that it makes reference to the complete absence of proprietary institu-
tions over a resource: a form of non-property.97  
Given this centrality of exclusion to a proprietary interest, a restric-
tion placed on invoking the law to enforce an exclusion, functions as a 
                                                                                                                                 
 94. Epstein, supra note 6, at 153. As he observes—“If any invasion, however small, 
counts as a compromise of the exclusive right of possession, why should there ever be any 
nonactionable trespasses?” 
 95. Id. at 153.  
 96. See generally, James E. Penner, The Idea of Property in Law (1997). Penner of 
course argues that the bundle of rights conception of property is a useless metaphor. 
 97. J.W. Harris, Property and Justice 109–10 (1996). 
BALGANESH TYPE.DOC 10/2/2006  2:08 PM 
Spring 2006] Common Law Property Metaphors on the Internet 295 
 
fundamental modification of the very interest in question and not just of 
its allied consequences. This point is critical and merits some elabora-
tion. If we assume the working definition of a proprietary interest to be 
the right to exclude, by legal process, another’s unauthorized use of a 
resource, then a re-postulation of this right that eliminates the element of 
recourse to legal process ought to be deemed a modification of the very 
right in question. To this, it might be argued that the proprietary interest 
lies in the very right to exclude, independent of any legal process. This 
exclusionary element, however, it is submitted, is not in the nature of a 
right but of a privilege, in the Hohfeldian sense. In the Hohfeldian analy-
sis, a right represents a legal claim which places another individual or 
group of individuals under a duty (usually a negative one).98 The content 
of the right derives primarily from its correlative, the duty. A privilege on 
the other hand, to Hohfeld was characterized by no one else having a 
right or claim to restrict the activity privileged.99 In this sense therefore, a 
privilege is defined by its positive content. Thus, the owner of a piece of 
land has the right to eject a trespasser and the privilege of building a 
house on his land (characterized by all other individuals having a duty 
not to enter the land and not having rights to restrict the owner from 
building the house, respectively).100  
Consequently, the exclusion which the law presumes (in a trespass to 
chattels action) does not derive from a right or a claim, but rather from 
the privilege of the owner to control the resource (movable) in a way that 
effectuates this exclusion. To take a concrete illustration—if a person 
owns a rubber ball (movable), the law does not grant to him the legal 
right to exclude all others who may simply touch the ball, i.e., it does not 
place them under a correlative duty of ensuring that they do not so touch 
the ball. But what it does however do, is that it enables (i.e., privileges) 
the owner to use the ball in such a way that he effectively excludes these 
others from touching it (e.g. by putting it in his pocket) and when he so 
uses it, it denies these others any rights/claims to prevent him from so 
using it.  
                                                                                                                                 
 98. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in 
Judicial Reasoning, 23 Yale L.J. 16, 30–32 (1913–14) (Hohfeld-I). Hohfeld went on to apply 
these constructions (i.e., jural opposites and correlatives) to the analysis of property as well, 
see Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Rea-
soning, 26 Yale L.J. 710 (1916–17) (Hohfeld-II). 
 99. Id. at 32. As he observes, “The privilege of entering is the negation of a duty to stay 
off.” 
 100. Interestingly, James Harris captures the same distinction in his analysis of property 
as a combination of (a) open-ended use privileges, (b) bounded by a trespassory right. The 
former is defined by its positive content and the latter by the existence of a correlative duty in 
others. Harris, supra note 97, at 63.  
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The law of trespass to chattels thus converts the right to exclude into 
a privilege of excluding, and thus effectively modifies the substantive 
content of the ordinary proprietary interest (i.e., in relation to immov-
ables). In analyzing the difference in standards of review adopted for the 
actionability of trespass and nuisance claims, Thomas Merrill concludes 
that a variation in the standard of actionability (for exclusion) is effec-
tively a modification of the substantive property entitlement, given the 
centrality of exclusion in the discourse.101 A trespass (to land), to be ren-
dered actionable needs little more than proof of actual physical 
infraction (i.e., a per se standard), while an action for nuisance requires a 
showing by the plaintiff that the action is ‘unreasonable’ and results in 
‘significant harm’ to his interests. It thus requires showing both that the 
harm is beyond a threshold de minimis level and that the harm itself is 
caused by an activity that brings less benefit than the harm it results in 
(the reasonableness element).102 The trespass to chattels doctrine lies 
somewhere on the spectrum between trespass to land and nuisance—in 
that it isn’t actionable per se, but merely requires a showing of some ac-
tual harm (as opposed to significant or unreasonable harm). In its being a 
deviation from the per se rules of normal trespass, it effectuates a modi-
fication of the proprietary interest in question. Consequently, the element 
of actual harm and its corollary, the presumptive sufficiency of self-help 
are elements that relate not just to the actionability of the claim in a re-
medial sense, but to the essence of the very wrong in question.  
Epstein seems to concede that this is indeed what happens in relation 
to nuisance and in its insistence on the harm caused being serious; it thus 
modifies the very property interest in question.103 His analysis concludes 
that the reason for this rule is a ‘live-and-let live’ rule of reciprocity fol-
lowed by the common law—that the loss of the action is compensated by 
a simultaneous release from the actions of all others. He notes however 
that this is not the same with trespass to chattels (in the electronic con-
text) and the self-help/actual damage rule.104 His reasoning is that 
whereas in relation to nuisance, the law gives individuals reciprocal 
easements over each others’ property rights in the interest of a Pareto 
improvement, in relation to trespass to chattels, the law keeps intact the 
                                                                                                                                 
 101. Thomas Merrill, Trespass, Nuisance and the Costs of Determining Property Rights, 
14 J. Legal Stud. 13, 19 (1985).  
 102. Id. at 18–19. 
 103. Epstein, supra note 6, at 156. “The property rights in land are redefined precisely 
because the allocative consequences are positive, and the implicit level of redistribution when 
all is said and done is zero.” 
 104. Id. at 154–55. For a more elaborate analysis by Richard Epstein of the tort doctrine 
of nuisance and its utilitarian constraints see Richard A. Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective 
Justice and Its Utilitarian Constraints, 8 J. Leg. Stud. 49 (1979). 
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initial allocation and merely denies injunctive relief. He also notes that 
there are no similar Pareto improvements to be had from a reciprocal 
forbearance as there exist for nuisance.105 As the previous discussion 
should make clear, the law does in fact recognize reciprocal releases by 
its conversion of exclusion from a right to a privilege, where it releases 
individuals from the duty they were correlatively placed under, by ordi-
nary trespass law. Further, there appears little reason to believe that a 
similar Pareto improvement does not exist in relation to chattels as 
well—where mere use without harm or deprivation to the owner seems 
to be mutually beneficial. 
Epstein’s argument distinguishing actionability and wrongfulness 
may derive some force from the language used by the Restatement in 
relation to trespass to chattels. As discussed earlier, § 218 requiring ac-
tual harm to the chattel deals with the issue of liability for a trespass to a 
chattel, the actual contours of the trespass being defined in § 217. Inter-
estingly however, the Restatement uses similar language in relation to a 
private nuisance as well, preferring to speak in terms of liability for a 
private nuisance, rather than enumerating its constituent elements.106 This 
makes it amply clear that the distinction between actionability and 
wrongfulness is not as absolute, for these causes of action. 
Going back to our discussion of the Hamidi case, the Court of Ap-
peal was thus mistaken in believing that the requirement of self-
help/actual damage was irrelevant when the remedy sought was an in-
junction rather than damages, since it remains integral to the nature of 
the wrong being sued upon to begin with. To further buttress its argu-
ments, the court however placed nominal reliance on the catena of case-
law on cybertrespass that had interpreted the harm element very loosely, 
to conclude that in the present case too, harm was actually caused by the 
diminution of system resources107 (as in CompuServe) and by the disrup-
tion it caused to the plaintiff’s business system, by requiring the 
recipient employees to ‘confront, read, and delete’108 the multitudinous 
messages. References to these forms of harm appear to serve little more 
than a palliative function; in attempting to liken the case at hand to past 
precedents (which themselves adopt questionable reasoning). 
                                                                                                                                 
 105. Id. at 157–58. 
 106. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 822 (1979), which reads, “One is subject to 
liability for a private nuisance if, but only if . . .,” while Restatement, supra note 33, at § 218, 
dealing with trespass to chattels provides, “One who commits a trespass to a chattel is subject 
to liability to the possessor of the chattel if, but only if . . . .” The structural similarity between 
the two provisions is plain. 
 107. Hamidi-II, supra note 90, at 250. 
 108. Id.  
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Kolkey J, in his short but strongly worded dissent drew attention to 
the absurdity of the majority’s position regarding actual injury.109 For 
one, he pointed out that it went well beyond the existent law and that it 
was far too innovative to consider the time expended on reading un-
wanted email messages a form of injury under the common law. 
Reiterating the centrality of actual harm to the tortious claim and show-
ing how the previous cases had in fact involved such harm, he then 
proceeded to show how a modification in the remedy sought (i.e., injunc-
tion instead of damages) did not eliminate the need to show actual 
injury.110  
On further appeal to the California Supreme Court, the matter was 
examined in great detail and the findings of the majority in the Court of 
Appeal reversed, by a narrow 4–3 majority.111 The gist of the majority’s 
reasoning was that the tort of trespass to chattels should not be expanded 
to encompass a mere electronic communication that neither impaired the 
system nor interfered with a legally protected interest of the owner. The 
court further reasoned that the injury, if any, that the plaintiff had sus-
tained in having its employees read the emails sent by the defendant was 
purely consequential and depended more on the content of the message 
than the message itself—similar to receiving an unpleasant letter by or-
dinary mail.112 Interestingly however, the court reviewed all the previous 
lower court decisions that had applied the doctrine of trespass to chattels 
to the Internet to find liability, and concluded that they were materially 
different from the case before it, in that the courts there had been shown 
the existence of actual harm. This affirmation of the open-ended harm 
interpretation adopted in these decisions, coupled with the court’s recog-
nition of the centrality of harm to the claim seems at best inconsistent 
and at its worst, hypocritical.  
The Court thus went on to approve the decision in CompuServe and 
its finding that the use of disk space and processing power was an im-
pairment; the ruling in eBay that the threat of future harm if the 
defendant’s activities were not restrained constituted sufficient harm for 
the action and the decision in Register.Com where the court found the 
existence of harm even when the plaintiff conceded that it was unable to 
determine the exact nature and extent of the burden the defendant’s ac-
                                                                                                                                 
 109. Id. at 258. 
 110. Id. at 260–63. To use his words, “Relaxation of the injury requirement would not 
merely adapt the tort, but change its nature . . . Dispensing with the requirement of injury to 
the value, operation, or condition of the chattel, or the possessory interest therein, would ex-
tend the tort’s scope in a way that loses sight of its purpose.” 
 111. Intel Corp, Inc. v. Hamidi, 30 Cal. 4th 1342 (2003) (hereinafter Hamidi-III). 
 112. Id. at 1347. 
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tivities were placing on its systems.113 The court found that Intel had suf-
fered no similarly equivalent harm meriting injunctive relief under the 
doctrine, since the harm it was complaining of was one which had little 
to do with any of its proprietary interests. Its refusal to find in favour of 
the plaintiff, while at the same time expressly approving previous cases 
where the damage requirement had been rendered moot has only added 
to the existent confusion and ambiguity discussed earlier.  
The decision of the court is even more interesting when one consid-
ers the fact that it was presented with a completely different alternative, 
at the very outset. Prof. Richard Epstein had in an amicus brief sug-
gested that the court abandon the actual damage requirement of trespass 
to chattels in favor of a ‘trespass to real property’ analogy for the Inter-
net.114 The court however refused to adopt this line of reasoning, 
concluding that the suggestion derived more from an attempt to create 
Internet metaphors from real-world situations. It proceeded to reason 
that the creation of an independent inviolability regime for computer 
servers would have the effect of ‘propertizing the Internet’ and was 
something that ought not to be undertaken without sufficient study.115 
The court’s reasoning that such a propertization would have the ef-
fect of generating new costs on the Internet is indeed laudable. 
Independent of any substantive merits which the Epstein suggestion may 
or many not have had, it certainly would have provided the area with the 
much required doctrinal clarity. The court’s insistence on analyzing the 
Internet through its physical media (i.e., computer servers) and generat-
ing electronic metaphors to deal with their unauthorized use (i.e., the 
passage of electrons or robots) only deepens the conceptual confusion 
inherent in the doctrine of cybertrespass. The court was presented with 
the opportunity of moving it away from the chattel-analogy, but turned it 
down. Coupled with its perfunctory approval of the previous line of 
cases as establishing a meaningful standard for actual harm, it muddles 
up the area of law even further. 
What then should the court have done, ideally? Assuming that the 
court was genuinely concerned about the implications of creating an 
open-ended inviolability regime for Internet property as Epstein was 
suggesting, it could still have made an effort to add some substantive 
content to the actual harm requirement by laying down an identifiable 
threshold requirement for the future. By preferring instead to distinguish 
the present case from previous ones on a largely vacuous factual basis, 
                                                                                                                                 
 113. Id. at 1354–55. 
 114. Id. at 1360. 
 115. Id. at 1360–62. 
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the decision left itself open to being criticized as doing little more than 
finding an excuse to deny the plaintiffs the remedy they sought. This was 
precisely what the dissenting opinion of Brown J did, when it accused 
the majority of expressing an unfounded ‘antipathy toward property 
rights’.116  
In a sense therefore, the California Supreme Court had legitimized 
the largely subjective and abstract determination of actual harm, of the 
previous courts as a consequence of its own finding that the facts before 
it did not disclose the existence of such harm. By thus creating a nega-
tive set of circumstances where an action would not be made out (as in 
the case before it), it presumptively added content (in the sense of a 
standard) to an equivalent positive set, where the action would lie. In 
reality however, the positive set never acquired such content. In School 
of Visual Arts v. Kuprewicz,117 a decision that followed shortly after the 
California Supreme Court’s ruling, the doctrine of cybertrespass was 
expanded even further. The defendant, a former employee of the plaintiff 
posted false job-listings on a web site causing users to send numerous 
emails to the plaintiff’s account, and also forwarded the plaintiffs’ email 
address to various pornographic websites, which resulted in the plaintiff 
receiving large volumes of explicit emails. It is important to note that 
unlike in the Hamidi case, the defendant had not directly sent any email 
to the plaintiffs, but had only facilitated the same by providing the lat-
ter’s contact details.118 While it dismissed several of the plaintiff’s claims, 
the court concluded that trespass to chattels was the only viable cause of 
action that could be pleaded in the instant case. Concluding that the de-
fendant had ‘caused’ large volumes of unsolicited emails to be sent to the 
plaintiffs, which had in turn depleted its hard disk space and processing 
power, the court found the element of harm to have been satisfied. Pre-
dictably, the court placed reliance on the Hamidi dictum that the action 
was not sustainable without actual damage, but concluded that this was 
indeed not the case here since a prima facie case of damage had been 
made out.119 
A direct consequence of the Hamidi decision was thus that it crystal-
lized the ambiguity and reaffirmed its presence in the realm of 
                                                                                                                                 
 116. Id. at 1368. Indeed, it could be argued that Brown J’s opinion went much further 
than merely showing how the plaintiff had indeed sustained actual harm along the lines of the 
prior cases. For one, he makes the argument that even a harmless trespass is actionable under 
the law. Further, the opinion also attempts to show how the plaintiff had sustained damages 
that ought to be sufficient to satisfy the legal standard, even though prior case is to the con-
trary—economic loss, a loss in utility and a diminution in subjective value.  
 117. 771 N.Y.S. 2d 804 (2003). 
 118. Id. at 807. 
 119. Id. at 807–08. 
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cybertrespass. While some have commended the decision as exhibiting a 
reasoned reluctance to propertize the Internet,120 it nevertheless failed to 
provide a strong analytical basis for its final conclusion (i.e., approving 
of the loose damage standard evolved by lower courts for chattels while 
refusing to adopt a realty metaphor)—and is thus in a sense, neither here, 
nor there.121  
D. Why Use the Trespass to Chattels Metaphor? 
In developing the doctrine of cybertrespass, courts thus had the op-
tion of choosing between the laws of trespass as applied to movables and 
the alternate version that applied to immovables, for their analysis—and 
they chose the former. It is important to note that this decision was a 
conscious one, for they were on two distinct occasions (i.e., eBay and 
Hamidi) sought to be persuaded by counsel to adopt an analysis of Inter-
net sites in terms of immovables. What then motivated this choice of 
metaphor? The choice of metaphor seems additionally intriguing, given 
the doctrinal gymnastics that courts have played to ensure that the cause 
of action remained within the realm of trespass to chattels. 
In Hamidi, the California Supreme Court rejected the realty meta-
phor, observing that it added little value, since the doctrinal requirement 
of a physical intrusion (in opposition to a mere intangible one) extended 
to trespass to land actions as well.122 More importantly though, the court 
justified its choice of metaphor by the simple argument that in the end 
computers, the communication devices involved, were in reality no dif-
ferent from pre-existent ones, which were all forms of personal property. 
It observed: “The plain fact is that computers, even those making up the 
Internet, are like such older communications equipment as telephones 
and fax machines personal property, not realty.”123  
                                                                                                                                 
 120. Pamela Samuelson, Unsolicited Communications as Trespass?, 46(10) Commun. 
ACM 15 (2003) (noting that the decision brings much needed balance to the law of trespass as 
applied to the Internet). Cf. Patty M. DeGaetano, Note, Intel Corp. v. Hamidi: Private Prop-
erty, Keep Out—The Unworkable Definition of Injury for a Trespass to Chattels Claim in 
Cyberspace, 40 Cal. W. L. Rev. 355 (2004) (arguing that the Court ought to have recognized 
economic damage as sufficient injury). 
 121. The majority also seemed to have been influenced to some extent, albeit a minimal 
one, by the implications a finding of liability would have had on the defendant’s First 
Amendment rights. They expressly noted that the granting of an injunction in the instant case 
would take the matter out of the realm of private action to that of state action, which would in 
turn have to satisfy First Amendment restrictions. Hamidi-III, 30 Cal. 4th at 1364. 
 122. Hamidi-III, 30 Cal. 4th at 1361. This conclusion is indeed questionable since the 
very basis on which the doctrine of electronic trespass was evolved by the court in Thrifty-Tel 
was the actionability of intangible intrusions onto immovable property owned by a plaintiff. 
Thrifty-Tel, supra note 40; notes 44–45 and accompanying text. 
 123. Id. 
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In relation to the Internet, it remains a well-established principle that 
the nature and extent of legal protection accorded to any action depends 
on the metaphor chosen to analyze the action in question.124 Each meta-
phor thus brings out and highlights certain factual similarities to the 
metaphorical source and downplays others and in so doing, thus modu-
lates the nature of legal analysis.125 This would certainly have been the 
case with the doctrine of cybertrespass—a metaphor of realty may have 
meant a radically different regulatory regime for website use and access.  
An alternative method of analyzing the choice between the meta-
phors of chattel and realty is in terms of the perspective adopted for the 
analysis. Orrin Kerr seeks to establish that much of the confusion sur-
rounding the development of Internet law relates to the issue of 
conflicting perspectives adopted for the analysis.126 According to this 
theory, any action on the Internet can be analyzed from either an internal 
or an external perspective. An internal perspective involves ‘treating the 
virtual world as if it were real’127—i.e., analyzing the Internet in terms of 
the real world, but on an experiential basis. For instance, to the user of 
the Internet, an internal perspective would involve the understanding that 
in accessing a web-site, the user is being taken to the webpage involved. 
An external perspective on the other hand, involves analyzing the Inter-
net (virtual world) not from a superficial or experiential basis, but in 
concrete real-world terms that involve the physical corporeality of the 
network and related communication technologies employed.128 In this per-
spective, the user of the Internet never really visits a web-page, but merely 
enters into his computer a set of instructions which allow it to retrieve in-
formation and data from another computer on the network, using a 
specific communications protocol. In our discussion of cybertrespass then, 
the realty metaphor would represent an internal perspective and the chattel 
analogy, its external variant. 
Now, the external perspective obviously exhibits greater fidelity to 
the physical reality of what exactly transpires during an Internet com-
                                                                                                                                 
 124. See A. Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor is the Key: Cryptography, the Clipper 
Chip, and the Constitution, 143 U. Pa. L. Rev. 709 (1995) (analyzing the constitutionality of 
encryption regulations). See also Alfred C. Yen, Western Frontier or Feudal Society? Meta-
phors and Perceptions of Cyberspace, 17 Berkeley Tech. L. J. 1207 (2002) (arguing that it is 
more prudent to analyze the internet using the metaphor of a feudal society). 
 125. To take the illustration of encryption—the legal consequences that would invariably 
follow if courts were to analogise encryption to language would be different from those that 
would follow if the analogy were to an envelope instead. Id. at 884. 
 126. Orin S. Kerr, The Problem of Perspective in Internet Law, 91 Georgetown L.J. 
357 (2003). 
 127. Id. at 359. 
 128. Id. at 360. 
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munication. But this does not necessarily imply that the internal perspec-
tive is any less true, when adopted as a mode of regulatory analysis. Kerr 
believes that the selection of perspective ought to depend either on the 
perspective implicitly suggested by the doctrine being invoked in a situa-
tion or on the perspective of the party which the law in question seeks to 
regulate.129  
In the realm of cybertrespass however, this does not necessarily ex-
plain the judicial preference for the chattel metaphor. For one, there isn’t 
a single doctrine in question—there exist two independent causes of ac-
tion, each adopting a differing perspective. Consequently, neither 
doctrine even so much as alludes to a perspective to be adopted. Sec-
ondly, it isn’t clear who exactly the doctrines are targeted at. This is a 
logical consequence of the doctrines being proprietary in nature; they 
thus operate in rem (against the world at large), with no clearly defined 
target. Kerr’s analysis thus isn’t particularly helpful in identifying the 
reasons for the courts’ adoption of the chattel metaphor in relation to 
cybertrespass. 
The perspective-based analysis may however prove useful in point-
ing us in the direction of a plausible explanation. As noted previously, 
the external perspective is significantly closer to the technological reality 
of what actually happens during an Internet communication. It thus ex-
hibits greater affinity to the physical/corporeal world and becomes less 
of a metaphor, in terms of abstraction. This intuitive urge to associate 
property concepts to a tangible entity (i.e., a res) is indeed something 
that property theorists have observed in the past.  
In analyzing continental legal systems, scholars have often noted 
how they often do not have a term equivalent to ‘property’ as it is under-
stood in the common law tradition. For instance, the German law 
concept of ‘eigentum’, which is often taken to be equivalent to the idea 
of property, is conspicuous in its limited application to tangible property, 
land or corporeal movables. Given then that tangible property is the 
paradigmatic case of the very concept of property, classifying an intan-
gible entity as a thing capable of being subjected to property rights is 
either (a) dependent on identifying a (sufficiently) tangible element for 
the right or (b) a complete non sequitur.130 One finds a divergence of 
opinion among continental European theorists on this issue. 
Wolfgang Mincke argues that to justify the broader usage of the term 
‘property’ to cover intangibles, some underlying universal substratum 
                                                                                                                                 
 129. Id. at 389–405. 
 130. James Harris, Property—Rights in Rem or Wealth?, in Themes in Comparative 
Law 51, 52 (Peter Birks & Arianna Pretto, eds., 2002). 
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needs to be found.131 On analysis, he concludes that the concept of ‘na-
ked value’ provides this substratum, allowing for the propertization of 
intangibles in an attempt to generate and exchange the social value de-
rived from them. To him, it is only this substratum that converts what 
would otherwise be a simple in personam right into a proprietary in rem 
one.132 According to Mincke therefore, for a property right to exist in an 
intangible, the tangibility of the resource must be replaced by the fic-
tional element of ‘value’ or marketability. He however concedes that this 
replacement occurs, not intuitively but for consequentialist reasons.133 
Bouckaert however believes that such fictions have little value. Arguing 
specifically in the context of intellectual property rights, he concludes 
that the centrality of the tangible res to a property discourse necessarily 
implies that a dilution of the same renders the right non-proprietary, i.e., 
a personal right rather than a real one.134 To him, property conceived of in 
terms of a real right consists of complete physical control over a re-
source by a person coupled with a legal rule recognizing this control 
within the legal system. Consequently, all other rights (in relation to in-
tangibles) are necessarily qualified as ‘partial alienations of this right to 
complete control.’135 In this reading therefore, a property right over an 
intangible entity is a misnomer, since the element of complete physical 
control is a legal fiction, not a physical reality. While they undoubtedly 
disagree over the possibility of a fictional substratum substituting the 
tangibility element, they both however seem to agree that paradigmati-
cally, all conceptions of property are premised on the existence of a 
tangible, physically controllable resource.  
The intuitive connection between person and thing, on which the 
tangibility element is premised is thus, often justified as pre-legal.136 It is 
indeed representative of the libertarian conception of rights, character-
                                                                                                                                 
 131. Wolfgang Mincke, Property: Assets or Power? Objects or Relations as Substrata of 
Property Rights, in Property Problems: From Genes to Pension Funds 78 (J.W. Harris, 
ed., 1997). 
 132. It is important to note that Mincke’s primary concern is with what the common law 
terms “choses in action” which involve the transferability of contractual debts. It however 
seems perfectly legitimate to extrapolate his argument to intangibles generally, as Jim Harris 
does. Harris, supra note 130, at 52. 
 133. As Mincke observes, “We need to be able to transfer obligations. Our economy 
would come to a halt without that possibility. So we need to model our legal tools according to 
this need.” Mincke, supra note 131, at 83. 
 134. Boudewijn Bouckaert, What is Property?, 13 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Policy 775, 796 
(1990). 
 135. Id. at 794. 
 136. As Harris argues is the case with Bouckaert’s analysis, Harris, supra note 130, at 
52. 
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ized by Harris as the ‘domain conception’ of rights.137 In this conception, 
which prominent philosophers such as Nozick subscribe to, individual 
rights subsist in a personal sphere of action, in turn fenced off by duties. 
They thus involve the entire sphere of what the individual may do as 
long as he doesn’t breach the fencing duties. They represent an open-
ended set and are impossible to be enumerated in finite terms. Conse-
quently, very often, their legitimacy is determined principally by 
evaluating whether the individual has breached a fencing duty or not, 
and if he/she hasn’t, then assuming that the activity is within the rights’ 
domain.138  
It is therefore plausible to argue that the court’s decision to adopt the 
chattel metaphor and analyze the activity in terms of the individual com-
puters constitutive of the Internet rather than in terms of the network 
itself, created by those very computers is a reflection of the intuitive ap-
peal of the ‘tangibility paradigm’, connected in turn with the domain 
conception of rights. The intrinsic appeal of a paradigm that enables 
owner-based physical control over a resource so as to render excludabil-
ity a factual as opposed to a legal reality, is but obvious. This element is 
also occasionally referred to as the ‘propertiness of property’139—the test 
of property being whether something can be taken from an individual. 
Consequently, the courts’ readiness to construct their analyses around 
what they could see, feel and physically control with a greater degree of 
certainty (i.e., the individual computer or server), seems understandable. 
Added to this is of course, the inherent complexity of the law of re-
alty. Had a realty-based metaphor been adopted for Internet trespass, it is 
conceivable that at least a part of that complexity would have carried 
over to the Internet, and the courts’ reluctance to deconstruct land law 
for the Internet may indeed have been another consideration. Indeed, it 
was precisely the necessity for this complexity that proponents of the 
realty metaphor for cybertrespass made the basis of their arguments, 
early on.140 The systemic complexity characterizing the common law ju-
risprudence of realty is a rather well documented phenomenon.  
Writing in 1904, property lawyer James Hogg noted how the English 
system of land law was mired in confusion and difficulties that had arisen 
as a consequence of the fiction of sovereign title to all land, the system of 
estates (legal and equitable) and rules relating to the transferability of the 
                                                                                                                                 
 137. J.W. Harris, Human Rights and Mythical Beasts, 120 L. Quart. Rev. 428, 434 
(2004). 
 138. Id. 
 139. Kevin Gray, Property in Thin Air, 50 Camb. L. J. 252, 266 (1991). 
 140. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
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fee simple.141 More recently, Kevin Gray and Susan Gray argue that the 
common law’s idea of real property ‘oscillates ambivalently’ between 
behavioral, conceptual and obligational models, which they characterize 
as those of property as a fact, property as a right and property as a re-
sponsibility.142  
It therefore becomes obvious why courts would have wanted to steer 
clear of such a complex body of legal rules. If they had indeed analo-
gized websites to land holdings, in applying the common law doctrine of 
trespass, it would have undoubtedly opened up an entirely independent 
set of questions, which they would have been forced to answer as well. 
What rights would an owner of a website have? Could an authorized 
user of a website be characterized as being in lawful possession of the 
site? Would such possession result in the user himself having a right of 
exclusion? Trivial and comical as they may sound, these questions would 
have taken the court into the realm of Internet regulation policy—an area 
not legitimately the subject matter for judicial intervention, much less 
intervention by national courts.  
Given these realities and intuitive underpinnings associated with di-
vergent concepts, one begins to make sense of the courts’ preference for 
chattel to realty, for the external perspective to the internal, for the tangi-
ble to the ephemeral and ethereal and for the simple to the complex. It 
remains to be seen what the implications of these choices are for our un-
derstanding of ‘property’ and its continued existence as an independent, 
morally-significant reality of social existence. 
II. Cybertrespass and the Metaphor of Property 
Having thus analyzed the emergence of cybertrespass as an independ-
ent proprietary action, we may now proceed to understand the implications 
such a doctrine has for our understanding of property and proprietary insti-
tutions. As stated earlier, almost all the existent literature on cybertrespass 
has focused on understanding the consequences this new proprietary doc-
trine has for the way in which the Internet operates and is regulated. The 
present part focuses on the converse interaction—the consequences of 
                                                                                                                                 
 141. J.E. Hogg, The Present Complexity of Land Law, and its Remedy, 20 L. Quart. 
Rev. 292 (1904). 
 142. Kevin Gray & Susan Francis Gray, The Idea of Property in Land, Land Law: 
Themes and Perspectives 15, 18 (Bright & Dewar, eds., 1998). See also Kevin Gray & Susan 
Francis Gray, The Rhetoric of Realty, in Rationalizing Property, Equity and Trusts: Es-
says in Honour of Edward Burn 1 (Joshua Getzler, ed., 2003), where the authors argue that 
large parts of real property law consists of little more than rhetoric that stands in for strict 
logic or deep rationality.  
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such a doctrine on the meaning of property and on the manner in which 
property metaphors are deployed as tools of regulation. 
A. What is Property? The Meaning (or 
Meaninglessness) of Property 
In his well-known academic piece entitled ‘Tu-tu’,143 Alf Ross sought 
to argue that the concept of ownership was a meaningless construct, with 
no semantic reference at all. Analogizing ownership to the tribal ritual he 
describes as ‘tu-tu’, Ross sought to demonstrate that the concept, much 
like those of ‘right’ and ‘duty’ was a tool for the technique of presenta-
tion, devoid of independent meaning and serving a purely functional 
purpose.144 Since the term referred to a set of conditions, which in turn 
gave rise to another set of consequences, Ross claimed that the term was 
completely dispensable. Ross was of course, following in the tradition of 
the Scandinavian Realists, who argued that all legal concepts were hol-
low constructs, and little more than means of social control, which arose 
from the psychological influence they came to bear on human minds.145 
While the argument itself appears intuitively appealing, on closer 
analysis it is unable to conclusively establish the complete redundancy of 
proprietary concepts. Harris categorizes such arguments as representa-
tive of ‘psychological reductionism’ and points out how they disregard 
the open-texture nature of legal rules, which often requires making refer-
ence to a set of values that a concept has come to represent socially.146 If 
through practice, an otherwise meaningless concept has come to acquire 
social significance, does it matter that to a complete outsider, the concept 
is hollow? In making this argument, Ross was (and indeed the other 
Scandinavian Realists were) assuming that a rule had to be independ-
ently meaningful to qualify as legitimate; an assumption that would 
question the very roles of custom and tradition in generating legal rules. 
While Ross’ argument smacked of a certain lack of cultural sensitiv-
ity,147 it remains a fact that identifying a universally acceptable definition 
for the concept of property, has been a task that property theorists in the 
common law tradition have found daunting, since at least the beginning 
of the 17th century. Nonetheless property analysts can be shown to share 
                                                                                                                                 
 143. Alf Ross, Tû-Tû, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 812 (1957). 
 144. Id. at 824–25. 
 145. See A. Hagerstrom, Enquiries into the Nature of Law and Morals (trans. 
C.D. Broad et al., 1953); Karl Olivercrona, Legal Language and Reality, in Essays in Juris-
prudence in Honour of Roscoe Pound 151 (R. Newman, ed., 1962). 
 146. Harris, supra note 97, at 129–30. 
 147. For instance his categorical observation that ‘the talk about tu-tu is pure nonsense’; 
Ross, supra note 143, at 812. 
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a core minimum, a consensus in their conceptualization of the subject. It 
is to be noted that the discussion is restricted to schools of ‘property 
analysis’ and by this I exclude the myriad philosophical theories that 
seek to justify the very institution of property. While these theories un-
doubtedly shed light on the concept of property itself, they invariably 
exhibit strong connections to the more general political philosophies that 
their proponents were advocates for, which in turn largely influenced 
their analysis.148 
William Blackstone in the mid-18th century defined property as ‘that 
sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the 
external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other 
individual in the universe.’149 Blackstone thus conceived of property as an 
in rem right, but attributed to it an absolute status. Scholars have over the 
years differed in their interpretation of Blackstone’s conception of the 
‘absolute’, with some regarding it as an anomaly (since Blackstone him-
self permitted the law to impose limitations on the right) and yet others 
as purposive hyperbole.150 What is however worth noting about Black-
stone’s definition is its identification and use of the element of 
exclusivity. To Blackstone it was thus not sufficient that the individual 
claimed a dominion over the resource, it was crucial that property also 
entailed the exclusion of other individuals’ rights over the same resource. 
Blackstone’s understanding of property came to form the focus of 
analysis for generations of positivist scholars including John Austin, Jer-
emy Bentham and others. The main point of intrigue appeared to lie in 
Blackstone’s conception of ‘dominion’. On the face of it, there appeared 
to be a contradiction, given that the concept of dominium in Roman law 
derived from Roman law’s absolutist (absolute, understood here in con-
trast to relative rights to possession) conception of ownership, which the 
common law had consciously rejected.151 Consequently began the proc-
ess of identifying the in rem rights that together constituted this 
dominion. 
                                                                                                                                 
 148. This would include the Lockean, Kantian and Hegelian justifications for property as 
also the theories put forth by Marx, Proudhon and Nozick. For a detailed study of some of 
these theories, placed specifically in their broader political context, see Jeremy Waldron, 
The Right to Private Property (1996); Harris, supra note 97, at 182–212, 230–246.  
 149. 2 William Blackstone, Commentaries *2. 
 150. See Robert P. Burns, Blackstone’s Theory of the “Absolute” Rights of Property, 54 
Cin. L. Rev. 67 (1985); Carol M. Rose, Canon’s of Property Talk, or Blackstone’s Anxiety, 
108 Yale L.J. 601 (1998); Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone’s Commentaries, 28 
Buff. L. Rev. 205 (1979); Harris, supra note 97, at 30. 
 151. See generally Peter Birks, The Roman Law Concept of Dominium and the Idea of 
Absolute Ownership, (1986) Acta Juridica 1.  
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At the turn of the 20th century, Hohfeld developed a novel method-
ology of understanding legal relations, using what he called ‘jural 
opposites’ and ‘jural correlatives’.152 Using a matrix consisting of rights, 
duties, privileges and a fourth variable (i.e., the no-right), Hohfeld set 
out to make the case for a consistent model of judicial analysis. In a sub-
sequent work, he applied this methodology to the analysis of in rem and 
in personam legal relations—which he termed, ‘multital’ and ‘paucital’ 
respectively.153 The crux of Hohfled’s thesis in relation to property was 
that property consisted of a large mix of multital jural relations (i.e., 
rights, duties, privileges, etc.), not all of which could be mapped at any 
given point of time.154  
Hohfeld’s model eventually gave rise to what is today known as the 
‘bundle of rights’ understanding of property, which grew to be im-
mensely popular among the legal realists of the 1920s and 30s.155 The 
bundle conception basically consisted of the idea that property was a 
bundle of complex jural relations in rem. To a very large extent, this 
bundle conception diluted property of any substantive meaning it may 
have acquired in legal discourses. Whereas even Blackstone had empha-
sized on the element of excludability, the bundle metaphor merely 
recognized the ‘right to exclude’ as one among several rights and privi-
leges accorded by the legal system to an owner. The bundle metaphor 
however proved to be of significance in functional terms, primarily in 
determining whether something had been removed from the bundle and 
was therefore short of full-property;156 but it could never answer what full 
property was, at any given point of time.  
Penner calls this simple version of the bundle metaphor the 
‘disaggregative bundle of rights’ understanding and proceeds to show 
how it is often used as a palliative for a sense of frustration that develops 
from the inability to attribute meaningful content to the idea of 
property.157 He notes that this has the consequence of including more 
than is necessary under the term and at the same time diluting it of any 
                                                                                                                                 
 152. Hohfeld-I, supra note 98. 
 153. Hohfeld-II, supra note 98. 
 154. Id. at 746. 
 155. See generally Max Radin, A Restatement of Hohfeld, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 1141 (1938) 
(where the author attempts to understand Hohfeld’s analysis from a realist paradigm). While 
Hohfeld did not use the phrase ‘bundle of rights’, later theorists have invariably tended to 
associate his views on property with the bundle conception.  
 156. It has therefore found extensive use by American courts in eminent domain or “tak-
ings” cases: see Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979); Dolan v. City of 
Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994). 
 157. J.E. Penner, The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. Rev. 711 
(1996). For an alternative critique of the bundle approach, see Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. 
Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 773 (2001). 
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critical significance it may have as a justificatory mechanism.158 Indeed, 
the bundle conception had the effect of developing an understanding of 
property in its purely functional terms, much along the lines of the 
Scandinavian realists discussed at the beginning of this section. While 
not in such direct terms, it too has given rise to a sense of skepticism 
over the meaning of ‘property’, by preferring instead to focus on what 
property did instead. 
In parallel with the bundle conception, developed a utilitarian 
framework of property analysis, which focused on analyzing property in 
terms of transaction costs and the allocative gains derived from the de-
ployment of the institution itself. Much of the scholarship in this area as 
also the entire law and economics movement can be traced back to the 
seminal work of Ronald Coase on transaction costs.159 Property in this 
understanding is viewed as little more than a collection of use rights with 
respect to a resource and one that is capable of achieving allocative effi-
ciency by ensuring the transfer of resources to higher valued uses.160 
While the bundle metaphor represented a form of ‘conceptual realism’, 
the utilitarian model posits itself as a form of ‘economic realism’—
making little effort to understand the institution of property in the form 
of an in rem right.161 This complete neglect by legal economists of the 
content of property rights, coupled with the growing popularity of law 
and economics scholarship in recent times, has only served to deepen the 
skepticism with the prospect of identifying any meaning with the con-
cept of property.  
Does this then mean that there is indeed genuine reason to be con-
cerned that ‘property’ is soon becoming a meaningless rhetorical term 
with little moral or political significance? Thomas Grey seems to believe 
that this is indeed what is happening and terms the process the ‘disinte-
gration of property’.162 Arguing that the bundle of rights conception 
represents a conscious effort to undermine the moral significance of the 
term, he posits that it is only a matter of time before property ceases to 
                                                                                                                                 
 158. Id. at 818–20. 
 159. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1 (1960). 
 160. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and 
Economics?, 111 Yale L.J. 357 (2001) (arguing that Coase was a hyper-realist and discussing 
some of the ramifications of this neglect). 
 161. Id. For some of the more prominent works in this genre, see Harold Demsetz, To-
ward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 Am. Econ. Rev. 347 (1967); Armen A. Alchian & 
Harold Demsetz, The Property Rights Paradigm, 33 J. Econ. Hist. 16 (1973); Yoram Bar-
zel, Economic Analysis of Property Rights 3 (1997); Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 
19. 
 162. Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in NOMOS XXII: Property 69 
(J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980). 
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be a concept of importance in legal and political discourses.163 Regard-
less of whether the bundle and utilitarian conceptions of property have 
sought to deny property any political significance, there is yet reason to 
believe that the wave of conceptual vacuity that characterizes property 
discourses under these heads has had the effect of stimulating new work 
on the ‘real meaning’ of property. A survey of this work enables the 
identification of a common minimum conception of property. 
This common minimum derives from the centrality of the concept of 
‘exclusion’ in property. The exercise of a property right over any re-
source is fundamentally premised on the ability to exclude some or all 
other individuals from using the said resource at the same time. This 
characteristic of ‘exclusivity’ or ‘excludability’ may manifest itself in 
different forms—it may be absolute or relative (i.e., it could be exercis-
able by an individual or a group), it may be in the form of a right or a 
privilege (in the Hohfeldian sense)164 and it may be de facto, de jure or a 
blend of the two (depending on the nature of the resource, whether tan-
gible or intangible). For a right to be categorized as a property right or as 
proprietary in nature, the element of excludability thus becomes critical.  
Attempts to construct property theories without the element of ex-
cludability prove to be meaningless rhetoric. Take for instance, the idea 
of ‘common property’—where everyone is said to have an affirmative 
right to use the resource, with no one having a right to exclude another. 
Rhetorically, it is claimed that in such a set-up, everyone has a property 
right to the resource. In reality however, just the opposite could be 
stated, and the situation would not be affected in the slightest way, prac-
tically speaking.165 Thus, the proposition ‘no one having a property right’ 
produces the same outcome as ‘everyone having a property right’, which 
renders the idea of a property right meaningless. Devoid of the character-
istic of excludability, property disintegrates into a meaningless term. 
Merrill tracks the uses of the ‘right to exclude’ in property dis-
courses and categorizes them into three—single variable essentialism, 
multi-variable essentialism and nominalism.166 Nominalism refers to the 
school which believes that property does not have any specified content 
and that its constituent elements keep fluctuating (e.g., the bundle con-
ception). Whereas multivariable essentialism believes that the right to 
exclude may be necessary but not sufficient to constitute property, the 
                                                                                                                                 
 163. Id. at 81. 
 164. Notes 98–100 and accompanying text. 
 165. See Harris, supra note 97, at 111–14, for a discussion of this aspect, which he 
terms the “logical priority of private property.”  
 166. Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 Neb. L. Rev. 730 
(1998). 
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single variable version believes that it is both necessary and sufficient for 
the same. Merrill then proceeds to make a case for single variable essen-
tialism, showing how once the right to exclude is accepted as a part of 
property, all other ‘use’ rights which property has come to be associated 
with (e.g., the rights to use, transfigure, transfer and devise) flow logi-
cally from it.167 While Merrill focuses on the excludability as a right (i.e., 
the right to exclude), I would however submit that his core thesis re-
mains the same, even when expanded to the general category of 
excludability, which would in turn cover both the right to exclude and 
the privilege of excluding.  
Merrill mentions both Penner and Harris as being other prominent 
essentialists, in their reliance on the primacy of excludability in explain-
ing the concept of property.168 To Penner, the very concept of property 
depends on the idea that others are to be excluded from a resource.169 In 
his analysis, this exclusionary element is not unprincipled, but rather 
grounded in the actual social use which the owner may put the resource 
to, once such exclusion is effected.170 In Harris’ model, property is best 
understood as consisting of an open-ended spectrum of use privileges all 
of which are bounded by a protective trespassory rule.171 Harris uses the 
expression ‘trespassory’ in relation to an exclusionary mechanism and 
notes that while such a rule is necessary for property, it is of course not 
sufficient.172 
There thus seems to be a growing consensus among theorists that ex-
cludability forms the sine qua non of any conception of property. Indeed, 
this is often taken for granted in a few well-known recent attempts to 
apply a property-based analysis to issues of regulation.173 Identifying 
property with excludability in relation to a resource, thus has the effect 
of adding substantive conceptual content to the term. Now, if property is 
effectively about exclusion, one begins to understand how in a large 
                                                                                                                                 
 167. Id. at 740–52. 
 168. Id. at 734–35. 
 169. Penner, supra note 96, at 74. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Harris, supra note 97. 
 172. Id. at 24. 
 173. For instance, the well-known problem of the “anti-commons,” propounded by Mi-
chael Heller, is premised on the recognition that a veto right, or a right to exclude someone 
from a resource is effectively a property right. To Heller, anticommons property arises in a 
situation where a large number of individuals have an exclusionary right over a resource, as a 
consequence of which the bundling of these rights in order to use the resource becomes pro-
hibitively inefficient, resulting in an under-use of the resource itself. Heller argues that the 
right to exclude and the privileges of use are fundamental to the concept of property. See Mi-
chael Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to 
Markets, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 621, 666 (1998). 
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number of situations the propertization of a resource disables access to a 
resource. In the context of tangibles, the exclusion may be de facto (e.g., 
boundaries or fences), but in relation to intangibles, the exclusion be-
comes de jure. Thus, patents and other rights that go by the name 
intellectual property enable such exclusion through actions for infringe-
ment, which the have the dual effect of determining the boundaries of 
the right in question and rendering the same inviolable.174 
Property is thus inextricably linked to excludability. Consequently, 
the creation of an exclusionary regime over a resource, complimented by 
(or grounded in) an open-ended and unbounded use-regime over the 
same, may appropriately be classified as proprietary in nature. This is 
precisely the manner in which the genesis of cybertrespass has had the 
effect of creating or defining new property on the Internet. To this, the 
obvious objection may indeed be that this may be possible when the re-
source (or the res) is clearly defined (i.e., tangible), not when it is 
transient or ephemeral like the Internet. Two points ought to be given 
consideration when this objection is raised.  
The first is the basic point that discussions of property have for long 
transcended identifying the concept with ‘things’ to understanding it as 
consisting of rights over or in relation to things.175 The second is the 
point that in relation to intangibles, it is the legal recognition and en-
forcement of a proprietary right that has the effect of defining the 
resource with precision in relation to which the right subsists. The pro-
prietary resource thus comes into existence de jure rather than de facto. I 
use the phrase ‘proprietary resource’ here to signify an entity subject to 
the exclusionary regime. In the tangible world, the resource is first iden-
tified with a fair degree of precision (de facto) and the exclusionary 
claim is then exercised over it. For intangibles however, very often the 
exclusion comes first, and then the (intended and unintended) conse-
quences of the exclusion are closely examined to identify the resources, to 
which access is effectively prohibited. Apt instances would be the eBay 
and International News Services cases discussed earlier.176 Since this de 
jure process is more often than not conduct-based—exclusion marginally 
precedes resource identification, since the impermissible resource-use 
                                                                                                                                 
 174. See generally Edmund Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 
J.L. & Econ. 265 (1977); Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics 
of Patent Scope, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 839 (1990). 
 175. Bruce Ackerman identifies this as the layman’s conception of property: Bruce A. 
Ackerman, Private Property and the Constitution (1977). 
 176. See eBay 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000), in relation to which the argument 
has often been made that the case created a new property right over the auctioneer’s informa-
tion, by restricting electronic spider access to the same and INS, where the court admitted to 
creating quasi-property over commercially valuable information. 
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(that the exclusion works to prohibit) is often an element of a broader 
legally impermissible form of conduct. For example, accessing is often 
an element of copying which is the conduct regulated.177  
To sum up, excludability provides property with its core content and 
exclusionary remedies effectuate the creation of new property rights over 
resources. This is precisely how the trespassory remedy of cybertrespass 
operates. As an extension of trespass to chattels, it regulates harmful 
conduct that impacts a chattel and in so doing enables an owner to ex-
clude others from the same. However, given the nature of the Internet, 
the tangible chattel isn’t the only resource from which others come to be 
effectively excluded. The multidimensional nature of the Internet effects 
an exclusion from more than just one resource and this is where the im-
plications of the same deserve closer analysis, which courts have thus far 
seemed reluctant to do. 
B. Property: Of Metaphor and Reality 
Having thus concluded that the element of ‘excludability’ remains at 
the centre of property, this section examines how excludability operates 
in relation to different resources. Why ought a regime of excludability 
(i.e., property rights) be created in relation to a resource? For tangible 
resources, it is generally the case that excludability becomes a pre-
requisite for usage. This excludability need not be by an individual, but 
may be by a finite number of individuals. Consider the following illus-
tration—A is in possession of a cup. Now if A wants to use the cup in his 
possession, it would be physically impossible for him to do so, if B or 
any other individual were either in physical possession of the cup or us-
ing it. Consequently, for A to make effective use of the cup, excluding all 
others from it, becomes a physical necessity. The same is the case with 
any other tangible resource. As the size of the resource increases, the 
only difference becomes the number of individuals that can use the re-
source, with all others having to be physically excluded again (e.g., 
while land or a house can house a large number of people, it certainly 
cannot house individuals up to an infinite number). This characteristic of 
the resource is referred to as its ‘rivalrousness’: that multiple (simultane-
ous) uses (beyond a certain number) of necessity become rival and 
mutually incompatible.178  
When we move from the tangible to the intangible world however, 
things become different. Take the case of informational goods. The us-
                                                                                                                                 
 177. There may indeed be cases where the de jure identification is done legislatively—in 
which case, the regulation is not conduct-driven. But these are very rare. 
 178. Boyle, supra note 3, at 33, 42. 
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age of information resources, is far from being rival. A single piece of 
information may be used by an infinite number of individuals simultane-
ously at any given point of time. Resources such as these are said to be 
‘non-rivalrous’ in character; i.e., multiple and simultaneous usage is not 
physically rival or incompatible.179 The Internet represents a non-
informational intangible resource. Appropriate analogies would therefore 
be air or radio waves. The Internet is therefore just as non-rival physi-
cally as informational resources.  
Indeed, it may in fact be plausible to argue that the Internet exhibits 
a form of ‘negative rivalrousness’. In the context of informational goods, 
an argument is often made, that though they are physically non-rival, 
they nevertheless remain rival in relation to their value. In other words, 
the multiple (simultaneous or not) use of the resource has the effect of 
depleting the resource of its value, in cases where such value derives 
from the reduced availability or scarcity of the resource. The Internet on 
the other hand, much like other communication media, derives its value 
from its increased usage. It exhibits what economists refer to in relation 
to communications media as a network effect. A network effect occurs in 
a situation where the value of a service or medium to its users depends 
on the number of individuals already using the said service or medium.180 
The Internet, being little more than a network of individual end-users’ 
computers, thus exhibits a classical network effect. Increased usage of 
the resource here, thus enhances its value rather than deplete it. Rival-
rousness is thus not just physically non-existent, but conceptually 
opposed to the basis on which the Internet functions. 
Thus, for tangible resources, the excludability is a product of physical 
necessity. In the case of intangibles (informational and non-informational 
resources), it derives from an instrumental necessity—the belief that ex-
cludability adds (and preserves) value. Given then that intangibles are not 
inherently amenable to a proprietary regime, excludability comes to oper-
ate de jure not de facto. In other words, the excludability regime is 
(artificially) imposed by the law, for instrumental reasons. Actual exclu-
sion can never factually be achieved, except by recourse to the law. 
Whereas, by using my cup I can exclude the rest of the world from using 
it, I cannot so exclude even my neighbor from reading his copy of my fa-
vorite novel, while I do so. Property in relation to intangibles is therefore 
                                                                                                                                 
 179. Id. See also Lessig, supra note 1, at 94–95. 
 180. See Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition and Com-
patibility, 75 Am. Econ. Rev. 424 (1985); Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal 
Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 Cal. L. Rev. 479 (1998); see generally, Oz 
Shy, The Economics of Network Industries (2001). 
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an instrumental creation and derives its justification not from the nature 
of the resource, but from the consequences of the counter-factual.  
Since there is little intrinsically proprietary about intangibles, ‘prop-
ertiness’ (i.e., excludability) is a creation of the law for instrumental 
reasons. This imposition of ‘propertiness’ is done through the use of 
metaphors, which transplant individual elements of property concepts 
from the tangible world to the intangible sphere. Thus, intangible equiva-
lents for the conceptual elements of boundaries, physical control, 
possession and the like are created in this process. If property is indeed 
about exclusion, then does the instrumental use of the property concept 
merely in order to ensure such excludability, have the effect of diluting 
property of its moral significance? 
Kevin Gray seems to believe that the metaphorical application of 
property concepts to new resources to effectuate varying degrees of ex-
cludability has the effect of rendering property a vacant concept—an 
illusion or worse still, a fraud.181 While conceding that excludability lies 
at the core of property, Gray argues that the classification of resources 
into excludable and non-excludable for physical, legal and moral reasons 
exhibits little coherence and has more to do with the broader power-
relations that ensue from such excludability.182  
Indeed, the use of metaphorical reasoning to propertize certain re-
sources may at times be hard to distinguish from situations where an 
excludability regime is introduced for deontological as opposed to instru-
mental reasons. This is possibly the reason for a considerable amount of 
confusion relating to the idea of people ‘owning their bodies’.183 A trespas-
sory (i.e., excludability) regime here operates to safeguard an individual’s 
dignitary (or privacy) interest in controlling his or her own body. The mere 
existence of this trespassory regime however, does not render the nature of 
the exclusionary right, proprietary. If property were little more than a 
synonym for excludability, there might indeed be a strong case for rec-
ognizing one’s body as one’s property, but property is more than that.  
While excludability is critical to property, the excludability is for 
reasons that are independent of the subject to which it is related. Thus in 
relation to tangibles, the existence of property rights (i.e., excludability) 
is to enable usage of the resource and in relation to informational goods, 
it is in order to preserve the value of the resource remaining scarce (and 
thereby capture the positive externalities associated with it). In this read-
                                                                                                                                 
 181. Gray, supra note 139, at 252. 
 182. Id. at 295–307.  
 183. See Stephen R. Munzer, Human Dignity and Property Rights in Body Parts, in 
Property Problems: From Genes to Pension Funds 25 (J.W. Harris ed., 1997); J.W. Har-
ris, Who Owns my Body?, 16 Oxford J. Leg. Stud. 55 (1996). 
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ing therefore, all property is instrumental—excludability for some pur-
pose.184 This explains why the notion of property in one’s body is flawed 
for, here the exclusion is a function of the object of the regime (i.e., the 
body) and not for objectively instrumental reasons. It also aptly illus-
trates that in applying property metaphors to a resource, it becomes 
critical to understand the reasons for doing the same. 
In discussing the application of the excludability metaphor to prop-
erty, Gray uses the decision of the High Court of Australia in Victoria 
Park Racing185 to understand the consequences of propertization. As 
noted previously, the majority in that decision refused to award the plain-
tiff an exclusionary remedy, arguing that to do the same would be to 
recognize in the plaintiff a ‘property’ or ‘quasi-property’ right in a spec-
tacle. Gray argues that in so doing, the court was recognizing that certain 
resources were incapable being subjected to an excludability regime for 
physical, legal or moral reasons.186 This is possibly just another way of 
saying that what the court was doing was examining whether the instru-
mental reasons for imposing an excludability framework over the 
resource were stronger than the physical, legal or moral reasons that ex-
isted for not doing so. The court in Victoria Park answered the question 
in the negative, while the American courts seem to have answered it in 
the affirmative, in relation to cybertrespass.  
The obvious next line of inquiry then becomes identifying the possi-
ble instrumental reason(s) the American courts might have had in mind 
while paving the way for the application of the property metaphor to the 
Internet. In this context, it would be apposite to make reference to an 
important observation Gray makes in relation to property. Gray argues 
that property is in the end, all about control over access to a resource.187 
In this reading, the element of excludability in property, enables an 
owner to control access to a resource and in situations where a court 
wants to accord de jure recognition to de facto control or alternatively, 
where it deems it appropriate to introduce such control de jure, it sanc-
tions the use of a property metaphor. Gray’s use of the word ‘control’ is 
indeed interesting, for it takes us into the important philosophical dis-
tinction between property and sovereignty that scholars have grappled 
with for some time now. 
                                                                                                                                 
 184. This understanding of property tracks Penner’s version as well, where he observes 
that property is a right to exclude grounded in the interest individuals have to use the thing 
from which others are so excluded. Penner, supra note 96, at 71. 
 185. Victoria Park Racing, (1937) 58 C.L.R. 479 (HCA). 
 186. Gray, supra note 139, at 269. 
 187. Id. at 292. 
BALGANESH TYPE.DOC 10/2/2006  2:08 PM 
318 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 12:265 
 
Associating property with control is indeed nothing novel. Black-
stone sought to do precisely that, when he used the phrase ‘sole and 
despotic dominion’.188 But control however is not unique to the idea of 
dominion. Dominion is indeed a proprietary concept, deriving from the 
Roman concept of dominium, which in turn meant ‘lordship’ in the sense 
of an ultimate right to claim the possession and enjoyment of a thing.189 
This idea is to be contrasted with the Roman law understanding of im-
perium—a public law concept that roughly translates into the modern 
conception of sovereign power.190 A critical distinction is thus to be made 
between property and sovereignty.  
In a well-known lecture delivered in 1927, the philosopher Morris 
Cohen sought to adopt a realist position and show that the increased ac-
cumulation of wealth and property at the time was resulting in a 
conflation of the two categories of dominium and imperium, rendering 
the conceptual divide artificial.191 Arguing that property consisted in ex-
cludability, Cohen shows how the accumulation of large amounts of 
private property by individuals and corporations enables them to exercise 
a large amount of control over the lives of other individuals; not just by 
regulating resource access, but also by being in a position to provide ser-
vices that had hitherto been within the domain of the state. While not 
necessarily objectionable for its own sake, Cohen persuasively estab-
lishes that there may indeed be a case for the need to examine the 
implications of this conflation, given that sovereignty requires the exer-
cise of power with the objective of human welfare, while property often 
works on considerations of economic efficiency and other market crite-
ria.192 The gist of Cohen’s argument is that property is moving from 
being an exercise of a right to an exercise of a power (in the Hohfeldian 
sense) and this point is indeed well taken. 
There thus appears to be very little in choosing between property 
and sovereignty as concepts, except that the former is in theory from the 
realm of private law and the latter of public law. However, this distinc-
tion is far from being water-tight and property can come to be 
characterized as sovereignty in certain factual situations (e.g., communal 
                                                                                                                                 
 188. Blackstone, supra note 149.  
 189. Joshua Getzler, Roman Ideas of Land Ownership, in Land Law: Themes and 
Perspectives 82–83 (J. Dewar & S. Bright eds., 1998). 
 190. See generally David Johnston, The General Influence of Roman Institutions of State 
and Public Law, in The Civilian Tradition and Scots Law: Aberdeen Quincentenary 
Essays 91–94 (D.L. Carey Miller & R. Zimmermann eds., 1997). 
 191. Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 Cornell L.Q. 8 (1927). 
 192. Id. at 29–30.  
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property) and sovereignty as property at other times.193 Again, it is quite 
possible that the distinction has very little to do with the philosophical 
basis of the divide and is more a matter of convenience. Property is thus 
capable of being viewed as the delegated exercise of sovereign control, 
in relation to a resource or a set of resources.  
A private law concept, property is thus capable of being deployed to 
achieve a public law purpose—regulation, ordinarily thought to be 
within the domain of sovereignty. By regulation here is of course meant 
the entire process of governance, the power to regulate individual behav-
ior in so far as it relates to a certain resource. Having identified property 
as being a term of largely instrumental significance, its use as a mecha-
nism of governance represents an additional instrumental purpose for 
which its excludability framework may be deployed. This process is 
however not without its own set of problems and these problems relate 
not to the conceptual conflation itself, but to the consequences of the 
delegated or decentralized governance.  
For quite some time now, the Internet has been considered by many 
to be a medium incapable of being subjected to regulatory rules.194 In-
deed, some have even sought to characterize the Internet as being 
inherently ‘unregulable’. Many reasons are responsible for this, but two 
of the rather well-known ones are worth mentioning here.  
The first is the fact that the Internet is a trans-national medium. Tra-
ditional methods of regulation involve demarcating spaces territorially 
and permitting individual nation states (or their units) to govern activities 
within each space so allotted to it. The inability of the Internet to be sub-
jected to divisions analogous to those in the territorial sphere has 
presented courts and legislatures with innumerable problems, in defining 
the concept of ‘jurisdiction’ on the Internet. Innumerable theoretical ap-
proaches have been adopted to circumvent the ‘boundary-lesness’ of the 
Internet, with varying degrees of success.195 The second reason relates to 
the very architecture of the Internet. The Internet (or the worldwide web) 
                                                                                                                                 
 193. See Joseph Singer, Sovereignty and Property, 86 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1 (1991) (observ-
ing how American courts use the distinction to their advantage in relation to American Indian 
land cases).  
 194. See David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in Cyber-
space, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1367 (1996); David G. Post, Governing Cyberspace, 43 Wayne L. 
Rev. 155 (1996); Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1199 (1998); 
John T. Delacourt, The International Impact of Internet Regulation, 38 Harv. J. Int’l L. 207 
(1997). See also Neil Weinstock Netanel, Cyberspace Self-governance: A Skeptical View from 
Liberal Democratic Theory, 88 Cal. L. Rev. 395 (2000) (arguing that self-governance 
mechanisms ultimately prove to be inadequate without adequate government backing). 
 195. Michael Geist, Is There a There There? Toward Great Certainty for Internet Juris-
diction, 16 Berkeley Tech. L. J. ¶ 5 (2001). 
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is a product of different layers of protocols, each of which consists of 
software code. Consequently, a modification or variation in this code 
results in a change in the way the Internet works. This code is obviously 
written by the individual end users whose computers constitute the 
Internet and is in a sense, private. The sequitur of this is that any legal 
rule can technologically be circumvented or overridden by a modifica-
tion in the code of the Internet. The commonplace rules of privacy, 
access, free speech, sovereignty and the like are all amenable to being 
rendered redundant through modifications in the very architecture of the 
Internet.196 
The complexity of the Internet therefore presents problems for the 
real world rules of spatial regulation. Using the property metaphor in-
strumentally here, to create a form of delegated sovereignty, is one 
approach to overcoming a large number of these problems. Since control 
is now effectively decentralized and distributed, its exercise becomes 
much more effective. Administrators of individual web sites and servers 
can control the access to and use of resources there. The governing law 
effectively becomes whatever the code on the website requires. Regula-
tion is thus privatized.  
By creating a novel exclusionary remedy for the Internet, in the na-
ture of cybertrespass, American courts were thus deploying the property 
metaphor as a regulatory tool. Implicit however, in this privatization of 
control and governance was the belief that a decentralized mechanism of 
private regulation would produce the same outcomes as mechanisms of 
state regulation would, in the real world. In a sense therefore, this is little 
more than the same theoretical framework Adam Smith proposed in his 
study of wealth maximization where he argued that individuals acting in 
their self-interest effectively enhanced societal interest.197 
Regardless of whether Adam Smith was right or not at a general 
level, we still need to ask the question whether the privatization of Inter-
net regulation through property metaphors is without its share of 
problems. What sets the Internet apart however, is that while it certainly 
                                                                                                                                 
 196. Lawrence Lessig, Code and other Laws of Cyberspace (1999). See also David 
G. Post, What Larry Doesn’t Get: Code, Law, and Liberty in Cyberspace, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 
1439 (2000); Mark S. Nadel, Computer Code vs. Legal Code: Setting the Rules in Cyberspace, 
52 Fed. Comm. L.J. 821 (2000). 
 197. See 4 Adam Smith,  An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth 
of Nations ch. 2 (R.H. Campbell et al. eds., 1976), where he observes—“Every individual is 
continually exerting himself to find out the most advantageous employment for whatever capi-
tal he can command. It is his own advantage, indeed, and not that of the society, which he has 
in view. But the study of his own advantage naturally, or rather necessarily, leads him to prefer 
that employment which is most advantageous to the society.” 
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is a forum for commerce and a market for economic exchanges, it re-
mains foremost, a medium of communication.  
Peter Huber argues that governmental regulation of the Internet 
ought to be abolished and instead replaced with a system of rules that 
evolve through market processes and the common law method.198 Huber 
argues that governmental regulation is inefficient and unproductive, 
while privatized regulatory strategies (through zoning and private prop-
erty rights) results in a more robust and efficient Internet, owing to 
competition.199 Huber would therefore find the instrumental use of the 
property metaphor in cybertrespass for regulatory purposes to best fit his 
hypothesis and his case for common law based private regulation of the 
Internet. 
Apart from the fact that Huber does not examine in detail the sub-
stantive implications of common law doctrine for the Internet,200 he also 
does not seem to address himself sufficiently to the fact that private law 
based regulation very often suffers from the disadvantage of not being 
equipped with the public interest safeguards that public law entails. Pub-
lic law attempts to regulate the interaction between the individual and 
the state. Thus, while it grants the state the power to control the behav-
iour and activities of individuals, it balances the same by in turn granting 
individuals—(a) a set of parameters against which to measure the legal-
ity of government action (primarily revolving around the criterion of 
public interest) and (b) a set of affirmative rights with which to safe-
guard their own liberty and autonomy (e.g., equality, free speech, 
privacy, etc.).  
When regulation moves from the domain of public law to private law, 
while the power structure is transplanted from the state to private actors, 
the checks and balances built into the public sphere are often lost. Public 
interest no longer remains at the forefront of the exercise of power/control, 
nor need it be, legally speaking. Similarly, individual rights such as free 
speech come to be legitimately overridden by proprietary use-privileges. 
Thus, if the owner of a website were to make accessing its content contin-
gent on providing some form of personal information or refraining from 
saying some things, individual users would be unable to argue that such a 
regulation were antithetical to public interest, or more importantly, that it 
violated their privacy and free speech rights, as they might have been able 
to, in the context of state regulation. Given that the Internet is in the end a 
communications medium, a decentralized private system of regulation 
                                                                                                                                 
 198. Peter Huber, Law and Disorder in Cyberspace: Abolish the FCC and Let 
Common Law Rule the Telecosm (1997). 
 199. Id. at 7–8, 71–77.  
 200. See Tom W. Bell, The Common Law in Cyberspace, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 1746 (1999). 
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would have the direct effect of allowing free expression rights to be 
overridden by property rights. Now, it could be argued that since a prop-
erty right is effective only when it is recognized and enforced by the 
state, and consequently, the entry of the state into this process would en-
able individuals to assert their rights indirectly. This was indeed 
attempted on two separate occasions in relation to cybertrespass. 
In CompuServe, the defendants asserted that though the plaintiff was 
a private actor, since it has a large quantum of control over a communi-
cations medium, it could be subject to First Amendment restrictions that 
enabled the property right to be overridden.201 The court however rejected 
this claim, arguing that it was up to the government to introduce such a 
balance and that the First Amendment could be asserted directly, only if 
the plaintiff was shown to be a state actor. In Hamidi, the defendant 
made a similar assertion, arguing that the enforcement of a property 
claim by a court amounted to state action that was in turn subject to First 
Amendment restrictions.202 While refusing to examine this claim in detail 
since it had held for the defendant on other grounds, the court neverthe-
less went on to conclude that when the property right itself was sought to 
be judicially enforced, it involved a state action that was subject to First 
Amendment restrictions. On the other hand, were the property right to be 
privately enforced (by the owner), no such restrictions would come into 
play.203 It thus is clear that common law proprietary doctrines do not suf-
ficiently account for public interest imperatives and consequently, when 
they are used instrumentally for public law purposes (i.e., regulation), it 
has the effect of creating a subtle imbalance. 
In this reading the deployment of the property metaphor in relation 
to the Internet is done for instrumental purposes—to decentralize and 
privatize control and regulation. While the instrumentalism itself may be 
efficient, it may however prove to be problematic in shifting our under-
standing of the Internet from one of a freely accessible medium of 
communication to a rigidly controlled proprietary resource.  
C. Resource or Medium: The Architecture of the Internet 
If property in general is really about power and control and in its ap-
plication to the Internet, attempts to create a privatized regulatory 
structure, as we have concluded, there may yet be problems with this 
                                                                                                                                 
 201. See CompuServe, 962 F. Supp. at 1026. Under American law, the general position is 
that where a private actor exercises control over a communications medium, the First Amend-
ment enables the government to enact legislation enabling access, in spite of the private actor’s 
property rights. See, Turner Broadcasting Systems, Inc. v. FCC, 512 US 622 (1994). 
 202. Hamidi-III , 30 Cal. 4th 1342 at 1364. 
 203. Id. 
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instrumental approach. The problems are however not those that derive 
from the process of propertization of the Internet generally, but those 
that are a consequence of the method through which such propertization 
is achieved, viz., the common law approach and the doctrine of cyber-
trespass. 
As mentioned previously, the common law effects a creation of 
property rights through a conduct-based regulatory mechanism.204 This 
involves the use of tort law, to define a category of impermissible activi-
ties. In relation to a proprietary right however, these impermissible 
activities invariably relate to a resource or an object (i.e., the res). The 
rights in the object are defined in opposition to the range of impermissi-
ble activities in relation to the same object that an individual (the owner) 
is allowed to enjoin by recourse to the law. To illustrate this point, con-
sider the case of Victoria Park Racing205 discussed earlier and assume for 
a moment that the court had in fact found for the plaintiff. The court be-
gan its approach by considering the nature of the activity that the 
defendant had undertaken. If the court had found the same to be imper-
missible (for unfair competition or other reasons) and made a declaration 
to the effect that ‘the commercial exploitation of another’s investment 
and its attributes was impermissible’, it would have served to create a 
property right in such an investment and its attributes (the object), but by 
excluding the defendant from the same. In other words, in the common 
law method of fashioning a property right, conduct comes first and the 
object of the proprietary protection only thereafter and solely in relation 
to such conduct. 
The obvious consequence of the common law’s emphasis on conduct 
in this process, is a relative neglect of the perceived need to define the 
object of such protection (i.e., the resource). This is of course under-
standable, given that traditionally, the common law only dealt with 
tangible entities, with clearly defined boundaries, in relation to which 
such definition would have proven redundant and superfluous.206 But 
once the process moved from tangible entities to intangibles, the effects 
of this neglect began to manifest itself. It is indeed arguable that one of 
the reasons for the court’s reluctance to find for the plaintiff in Victoria 
                                                                                                                                 
 204. See note 176 and accompanying text. 
 205. Victoria Park Racing & Recreation Co Ltd v. Taylor, (1937) 58 C.L.R. 479 (HCA). 
 206. For example, in an action for trespass to one’s horse, it would have been utterly 
meaningless to have required the law to define the object (i.e., the horse) with any precision, 
since the boundaries of the object are not merely notional, but real. 
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Park Racing was its inability to identify the object in relation to which 
the exclusion was to be effected.207 
It could be argued that the attempt to identify an entity with great 
precision is a meaningless exercise and one that need not deter courts’ 
according plaintiffs’ interests proprietary protection. Property could thus 
be conceived as existing in anything in relation to which time, effort, 
labour or money is expended to enhance its commercial value, regardless 
of its tangible or intangible nature.208 This approach to identifying an ob-
ject worthy of exclusionary protection is not entirely without merit. It is 
however inevitably dependent on the instrumental purpose for which the 
property metaphor (or concept) is employed. If the object of propertizing 
something (i.e., creating property rights over something) is to protect the 
commercial value inherent in the resource from depletion through use, 
then allowing the resource to be defined in terms of the entity possessed 
of value makes perfect sense (e.g. intellectual property rights such as 
patents).209 If on the other hand, the instrumental purpose for which the 
concept is employed is something else (e.g. regulation), then adopting a 
value-based understanding of the object of protection achieves very lit-
tle.  
The move from the tangible world to the virtual is probably more 
complicated than the transition from the tangible to the intangible, for 
two reasons. The first is that the reasons for employing the property con-
cept here differ (and are not always connected with the protection of 
commercial value). The second derives from the nature of the virtual 
world (i.e., the Internet) and the manner in which we understand entities 
and resources in or on it. We have seen how courts tend to analyze the 
Internet as a collective of movables. Even within the paradigm of mov-
ables, they chose to adopt a specific conception of ownership control.210 
                                                                                                                                 
 207. The plaintiff had sought to assert a property or quasi-property right in a spectacle. 
Victoria Park Racing & Recreation Co Ltd v. Taylor, (1937) 58 C.L.R. 479, 479 (HCA) (per 
Latham CJ). Kevin Gray uses the Victoria Park case and the opinions of the various judges 
therein to identify different reasons why certain resources may be deemed inherently non-
excludable—physical, legal and moral. Gray, supra note 139, at 269–92.  
 208. D.F. Libling, The Concept of Property: Property in Intangibles, 94 L. Quart. Rev. 
103, 119 (1978). 
 209. It could of course be argued that such an approach is flawed since the reasoning it 
adopts is in effect circular: because the value in an object needs to be protected, the object can 
be understood as the very entity that possesses such value. 
 210. See Harold Smith Reeves, Property in Cyberspace, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 761 (1996) 
(outlining three different conceptions of property boundaries on the Internet—the system-level 
boundary, the open-system boundary and the individual level boundary models). In relation to 
cybertrespass, they seem to alternate between a system level and individual level boundary 
model. 
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The very adoption of this paradigm of analysis however, may pose cer-
tain problems given the unique architecture of the Internet.  
Among the various models used to analyze the architecture of the 
Internet, the most prominent one is the ‘layers model’. Yochai Benkler 
was one of the earliest to employ this model in his analysis of the Inter-
net and his arguments for the creation of a sustainable commons 
therein.211 In this model, a communications system can be understood by 
segregating it into three independent layers; (a) the physical infrastruc-
ture layer, consisting of the hardware (computers, wires, cables) that 
physically connects the various computers constitutive of the network; 
(b) the logical infrastructure layer, consisting of the myriad software 
code and protocols (e.g. TCP/IP, HTTP) that define the way in which the 
network operates and through which the hardware interacts and (c) the 
content layer, consisting in turn of the actual data that gets transmitted 
across the network—the software programs, the information and the 
plethora of other related material.212 These layers are sandwiched one 
over the other, with the physical layer at the bottom and the content layer 
at the very top.  
The crucial thing to remember in relation to these layers is that they 
are capable of operating independently and consequently, different regu-
latory regimes exist for each of them. Thus, the physical layer (cables, 
hardware) is governed by the ordinary rules of property law (chattels), 
while the content layer is governed by rules that determine use and ac-
cess rights in relation to information and data (such as copyright law). In 
making his argument for a digitally networked commons, Benkler notes 
how an open-access regulatory mechanism will have to be developed at 
each individual layer, in order to achieve the same.213 
However, just because the layers are capable of operating independ-
ently, it does not mean that changes at one layer do not influence 
another. The linearly sandwiched nature of the layers is responsible for 
this. Consequently, a regulatory spill-over remains a distinct possibility. 
In a fairly elaborate study of the interaction between the architecture of 
the Internet and its regulation, Lawrence Solum and Minn Chung lay 
down what they term, the ‘layers principle’.214 The core of the layers 
principle states that any system of regulation for the Internet needs to 
show respect for the integrity of the layers and this in turn is said to have 
                                                                                                                                 
 211. Yochai Benkler, From Consumers to Users: Shifting the Deeper Structure of Regu-
lation Toward Sustainable Commons and User Access, 52 Fed. Comm. L.J. 561 (2000). 
 212. Id. at 562; Lessig, supra note 1, at 23. 
 213. Id. at 579. 
 214. Lawrence Solum & Minn Chung, The Layers Principle: Internet Architecture and 
the Law, 79 Notre Dame L. Rev. 815 (2004). 
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two connected corollaries: (i) that regulation should never compromise 
the separation between the layers and (ii) the regulation should attempt 
to minimize the distance between the layer at which the law aims to pro-
duce an effect and the layer directly affected by the regulation in 
question.215 
Analyzing the Internet in terms of layers, they go on to propound 
two theses. The first, the ‘fit thesis’ postulates that layer-crossing regula-
tions produce problems of fit between the regulatory ends in question 
and the means employed to achieve the same.216 The second, the ‘trans-
parency thesis’ states that layer-violating regulations are inherently 
detrimental to the transparency of the Internet.217 The misfit is thus sup-
posed to result in regulatory over-breadth and under-inclusion, while the 
reduction in transparency is shown to enhance the costs of innovation on 
the Internet. Regulation must thus be optimally tailored to focus exclu-
sively on the layer it is directed at, and regulators must make a conscious 
effort to guard against violating the layers principle, according to this 
analysis. 
The doctrine of cybertrespass is essentially a modified version of the 
common law tort of trespass to chattels. Its focal point is thus the indi-
vidual computer/server of a plaintiff—i.e., the hardware. As a doctrine, it 
is therefore ostensibly directed at the physical layer of the Internet, at-
tempting to regulate use and access to the hardware end-units, through a 
privatized, proprietary mechanism. But is this really what the doctrine is 
attempting to regulate? In reality, there may exist reason to believe that 
the doctrine is more concerned with regulating web-space itself, rather 
than the physical medium. Take the cases of CompuServe218 and eBay,219 
both critical in relation to the evolution of the doctrine. In CompuServe, 
the court was ostensibly concerned with the physical intrusion onto the 
plaintiff’s physical mail server. The problem however, is that there was 
no intrusion or harm to the plaintiff’s physical hardware. The intrusion if 
any was at the level of the internal (i.e., logical) mail server and the pro-
tocols involved there (i.e., SMTP220). This is even more obvious in the 
eBay case, for there too, the electronic robots did not actually intrude 
onto the plaintiff’s computer. They had merely gathered information by 
                                                                                                                                 
 215. Id. at 817. 
 216. Id. at 879. 
 217. Id. at 878.  
 218. CompuServe, 962 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D. Ohio 1997). 
 219. eBay, 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal., 2000). 
 220. The abbreviation for Simple Mail Transfer Protocol, the protocol that regulates the 
transmission of electronic mail messages from one server to another. 
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sending requests for the same to the plaintiff’s computers, which had in 
turn delivered it to the defendant. There was never any actual intrusion. 
What the courts had thus done, in applying the doctrine of cyber-
trespass, was to base the doctrine on metaphor, rather than reality. Given 
that the Internet is often described in terms of metaphors, the court 
adopted the ideas of ‘entering’, ‘visiting’, ‘intruding’ and the like to ap-
ply the doctrine. In reality however, these activities never happen. When 
a person accesses a website by entering the address of the site into a 
browser, in reality, the browser never goes or visits any place, it merely 
sends information to a server, which in turn transmits information to the 
user’s computer, according to a set protocol.221 It is the same informa-
tion-request process that comes into play in relation to electronic mail as 
well. In sum, there was nothing physical about these intrusions. Dan 
Hunter notes how, in applying cybertrespass, courts have varied the re-
source in relation to which the exclusionary rule is sought to be applied 
between the computer, the bandwidth, the capacity, the processing power 
and the network and that apart from the first one (i.e., the computer) 
none of the others are chattels, by any stretch of imagination.222 
The doctrine of cybertrespass was therefore about regulating the 
logical layer of the Internet, about how SMTP exchanges might occur 
and the manner in which robot protocols could retrieve information from 
websites. This was a consequence of the sandwiched architecture of the 
Internet. It did not however stop here. The layered nature of the Internet 
has also resulted in the doctrine indirectly regulating the content layer as 
well. This is most obvious in the eBay case, where the real issue was the 
defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s price information; information valuable, 
yet freely accessible in the public domain. The issue also arose in the 
Hamidi case, where the real reason for the defendant’s recourse to the 
law was the derogatory nature of the defendant’s mails rather than its 
quantity.223  
A direct consequence of the courts’ inability to define the object in 
relation to which the exclusion is being effected through a common law 
method is a regulatory ambiguity, resulting in either an over-
propertization or an under-propertization. In both situations, the integrity 
of the layers is compromised. Further, given that the physical layer and 
                                                                                                                                 
 221. Lemley, supra note 4, noting that ‘[t]he Internet is merely a simple computer proto-
col, a piece of code that permits computer users to transmit data between their computers 
using existing communications networks.’ 
 222. Hunter, supra note 4, at 486.  
 223. Hamidi-III, 30 Cal. 4th 1342 at 1358, where the court observed that “fictionally 
recharacterizing the allegedly injurious effect of a communication’s contents on recipients as 
an impairment to the device which transmitted the message.” 
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the content layer are both already the subject matter of regulatory re-
gimes, it is indeed questionable whether the approach of regulating the 
intermediary logical layer through either of these layers is appropriate.  
If the logical layer is the object of regulation, the common law 
methodology of applying a property metaphor instrumentally to achieve 
the same is undermined by an inability to identify a bounded object of 
the property right, i.e., the thing or the res, an integral element in any 
conception of property. Epstein seems to believe that difficulties such as 
these are capable of working themselves pure through the common law 
method incrementally and that there is no reason for worry or caution.224 
Interestingly, Solum and Chung seem to be precisely against such in-
crementalism, arguing that since the direction of future innovation on the 
Internet remains unknown, even an individual case-by-case utilitarian 
balancing approach suffers from a lack of adequate information, which 
has the inevitable consequence of compromising the transparency intrin-
sic to the Internet.225 The common law process of incremental doctrinal 
development has been shown to exhibit several critical path dependent 
characteristics, most of which derive from its use of precedent and the 
doctrine of stare decisis.226 A process is said to be path dependent if its 
developmental direction is influenced by its own history.227 Some of the 
crucial characteristics of a path dependent common law process or de-
velopment are: non-ergodicity—where small short-term decisions have 
large, unintended long-term consequences; inflexibility—where an early 
rule determines future outcomes owing to courts’ unlikeliness to deviate 
without strong reason and indeterminacy of eventual outcome—in that 
the eventual consequence of the rule or doctrine is unpredictable.228  
In its short history, the common law doctrine of cybertrespass has 
seemingly exhibited several of these path dependent characteristics. To 
begin with, each of the cases that contributed to the evolution of the doc-
trine relied on past decisions to reach its conclusion. CompuServe relied 
on Thrifty-Tel; eBay on CompuServe; Register.com on eBay; and the 
                                                                                                                                 
 224. Epstein, supra note 6, at 73, 76, 87.  
 225. Solum & Chung, supra note 214, at 854–60. Another reason they cite is the lack of 
institutional capacity on the part of regulators to achieve such a case-by-case balancing 
through an incremental process.  
 226. Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal 
Change in a Common Law System, 86 Iowa L. Rev. 101 (2001). 
 227. See Paul A. David, Path Dependence, its Critics and the Quest for a ‘Historical 
Economics’, Keynote Address to the European Association for Evolutionary Political Econ-
omy” Athens Meetings, 7–9 November 1997. 
 228. Hathaway, supra note 226, at 129–35. 
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AOL cases on CompuServe.229 By the time the Supreme Court of Califor-
nia delivered its judgement in Hamidi, the doctrine had evolved adopting 
a chattel (as opposed to realty) metaphor. At this stage, even though the 
court seemingly recognized the inadequacies of this metaphor selection, 
it was too late for it to effect a complete reversal altogether (exhibiting 
non-ergodicity and an inflexible lock-in). Its attempt to rationalize the 
past decisions and portray them as being without flaw (in order to avoid 
having to explicitly differ with them),230 only resulted in an increased 
outcome indeterminacy in the process.  
Epstein, in his analysis of cybertrespass is forced to concede that real 
property rules offered courts a much better fit than did those relating to 
chattels, since ‘cyberspace looks and functions more like real property 
than chattels.’231 Implicit in this concession is the recognition that the 
subject matter of the property right (i.e., the thing or the res) in relation 
to cybertrespass, namely cyberspace, remains ill-defined. If the common 
law process in general and the evolution of cybertrespass in specific are 
indeed path-dependent, there appears little reason to be optimistic about 
the role of an incremental process in working to remedy these funda-
mental ambiguities.  
The attempt to regulate the logical layer through the market mecha-
nism of creating a common law property right thus suffers from a major 
methodological drawback. While regulation undoubtedly concerns indi-
vidual conduct, a property-rule invariably must involve an identifiable 
res in relation to which the conduct is proscribed. A failure to do so ob-
scures the proprietary nature of the right. Property is concededly, about 
relations between persons; but these relations invariably manifest them-
selves around an object (a thing) and never in abstract, for it is only by 
masking the individual identity behind an a-personal thing, that the right 
acquires its in rem nature.  
Yochai Benkler, in his discussion of the allocation of rights in the 
wireless spectrum, notes that regulation is ultimately about conduct and 
that the use of the property metaphor for regulatory purposes should not 
result in a dogmatic (and ultimately futile) search for a resource.232 
Benkler was however not dealing with the common law method of creat-
ing property rights through a tortious doctrine, but rather with the 
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process of allocating rights over the spectrum, rights which economists 
identify as proprietary in nature. This process of allocating property 
rights over an intangible medium can be traced back to Ronald Coase, 
and his ideas for privatizing the broadcast spectrum.233 Indeed, this 
method of viewing property rights in terms merely of ‘permitted uses’ is 
characteristic of the economic analysis of law.234 In this conception, the 
‘use right’ (i.e., shooting a gun) assumes more importance than identify-
ing the owner of the resource (i.e. airspace) to which the use relates. 
Coase’s preference for viewing the matter in terms of an assignment 
of tradable use rights was linked to his use of the law of nuisance to ex-
plain the phenomenon of transaction costs.235 Much of his argumentation 
relating to transaction costs derived from the apparent reflexivity of 
harm and the balancing exercise that courts had to carry out in deciding 
nuisance claims. Nuisance and trespass, though related, are fundamen-
tally different in their approach. Nuisance involves a balancing exercise, 
which some characterize as utilitarian, while trespass ordinarily involves 
the mechanical application of an exclusionary rule.236 Consequently, the 
need to define the object of the right is less critical in the law of nui-
sance, given that it focuses almost completely on the defendant’s 
behavior and attempts to balance the gains from the same against the 
costs incurred by the plaintiff as a direct consequence. 
An exclusionary mechanism such as trespass however involves far less 
balancing and almost always adopts a near mechanical two step process of 
‘intrusion–exclusion’. Identifying the object of the intrusion and the con-
sequent exclusion therefore assumes greater importance. Applying the 
Calabresi-Melamed model237 to the trespass-nuisance dichotomy, we see 
that while trespass is characteristic of a property rule, the law of nuisance 
is aptly representative of a liability rule (in allowing for a court enforced 
sale of the right). Thus, adopting a nuisance-based approach to regulat-
ing the logical layer of the Internet might have rendered obsolete the 
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need to define the resource in question and maintained the integrity of 
the individual layers.238 Unfortunately, courts did not see the rationale in 
this approach. 
Even if the instrumental use of the property metaphor to achieve pri-
vatized regulation is deemed unobjectionable, the common law method 
through which this was sought to be achieved (i.e., the doctrine of cyber-
trespass) exhibits fundamental conceptual flaws. Property is in the end 
about excluding individuals from something for a specific purpose. As-
suming that the purpose has been identified, the thing from which the 
right operates to exclude individuals is just as important as the element 
of exclusion. This point is borne out by the fact that conceptually ex-
cludability (in relation to a property right) is meaningful only in so far as 
it is balanced by and protects use privileges. Excludability for its own 
sake, devoid of use or access privileges does not constitute property. Use 
and access are in turn intransitive, requiring the identification of a re-
source over which they are to operate. Thus, when the resource from 
which the exclusion is to operate is poorly defined, it begins to under-
mine the proprietary nature of the right in question. The continued use of 
the property metaphor within such a framework distorts even the most 
basic understanding of property—as always being in relation to an iden-
tifiable object. 
Conclusion 
What then happens to the concept of property, as it is used in the 
context of the virtual world of the Internet? 
The previous discussion has sought to establish that the metaphorical 
application of property concepts to the Internet is intricately linked to a 
shift in (a) the reasons for which proprietary concepts (based on exclu-
sion) are employed and (b) the primacy of the propertiness of property, 
or the need to identify the concept with a bounded resource. The doctrine 
of cybertrespass operates at the interface of property and tort law, at-
tempting to vindicate a putatively pre-existent property right, through an 
exclusionary remedy. The need for this exclusion derives however nei-
ther from the nature of the resource (as it does for tangibles) nor from 
the need to protect the value inherent in a resource, which might be de-
pleted through multiple use (as it does for informational resources). It 
seems to derive largely from an attempt to deploy the element of control 
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inherent in the exclusionary feature of a property right to develop a de-
centralized regulatory structure for the Internet. Property is thus 
employed instrumentally, to achieve a purpose not directly connected 
with the resource over which the right is to operate. The sequitur of this 
is that such an instrumental use avoids defining the real target of the 
right, or the resource over which the exclusionary mechanism is meant 
to operate.  
If we accept that property, at its bare minimum consists of the ele-
ment of excludability operating over an identifiable thing, employed for 
a particular purpose, cybertrespass may thus be viewed as employing the 
concept of property instrumentally, through the mechanism of tort law. 
On the face of it, the concession that property in this context (and some 
others) is largely about instrumentalism, may seem to be arguing for a 
form of property skepticism that some theorists have espoused. While it 
is true that property may be used for both intrinsic and instrumental pur-
poses, this concession alone need not lead one down the slippery slope 
of skepticism. 
As noted, a proprietary regime may be deployed for reasons that de-
rive from the rivalrous nature of the resource or, instrumentally, for 
reasons that are either connected to or independent of the resource. Ap-
plying the concept of property instrumentally is not in itself problematic. 
It becomes so however in situations where this instrumentalism comes to 
erode the minimum core of property. When this move becomes fairly 
well entrenched, the turn to skepticism is indeed not far away. The de-
veloping category of cybertrespass illustrates this. 
Property, as an in rem right uses the idea of an a-personal ‘thing’ as 
its focal point to enable interpersonal interactions.239 The ‘thing’ thus an-
chors the exclusionary regime, given that excludability as a concept is 
intransitive, requiring a resource to become operational. The law of tres-
pass, of which cybertrespass is a derivative, further builds on this, by 
presuming public knowledge of the existence of the ‘thing’ and its 
boundaries. The doctrine of cybertrespass however, in the manner in 
which it has been interpreted by courts, premises its analysis on a meta-
phorical understanding of the Internet while yet applying a tort law 
doctrine that is premised on a physical intrusion. In the process it fails to 
identify with any precision the ‘thing’ in relation to which the exclusion-
ary remedy effectively operates. Given the centrality of the ‘thing’ to the 
concept of property, this failure effectively results in the instrumental 
purpose coming to dominate the very concept. We have already seen that 
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this conscious attempt to undermine the relevance of the thing, is some-
thing characteristic of the economic analysis of property rights, and can 
be traced back to Ronald Coase, who viewed property as consisting of 
tradable rights to perform certain activities, rather than ownership privi-
leges.240 If this method of reasoning is indeed adopted, there may be little 
reason to categorize the rights as constitutive of ‘property’, merely be-
cause of their tradability. Property consists of more than just the 
tradability of rights and derives from the underlying nature of those 
rights. 
In the end, the doctrine of cybertrespass may represent little more 
than legal sophistry. Both sides of the policy debate (on the propertiza-
tion of the Internet) seem more than ready to lace their arguments with 
sophisticated legal concepts and courts have been more than willing to in 
turn accept the same. Concepts such as ‘property’ and ‘trespass’ however 
come to any discourse with a fairly well defined meaning and a failure to 
acknowledge this in its entirety, obfuscates both the meanings of the 
conceptual tools deployed and the very purpose for which they are so 
deployed. The confusion that currently exists in the law of cybertrespass 
on the element of ‘actual damage’ aptly reflects this.  
Cyberspace, with its negative rivalry, exhibits little intrinsic need for 
propertization. While there certainly may have existed the need to de-
velop a regulatory regime for the Internet, the use of proprietary 
concepts for the same under the doctrine of cybertrespass has only re-
sulted in more ambiguity and confusion than it has in any meaningful 
regulation. We can look forward to a time when courts come to realize 
that regulation and governance on the Internet may be better served by 
analytical tools other than property metaphors.  
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